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WHEN HARASSMENT AT WORK IS HARASSMENT AT CHURCH:
HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENTS AND THE MINISTERIAL
EXCEPTION
BY RACHEL CASPER*
Abstract. Sexual harassment and harassment on the basis of race, national origin, disability,
and age are unlawful workplace practices; what does that mean when one’s workplace is a
church? This article explores the ministerial exception’s application to hostile work
environment claims. Can ministerial employees bring harassment claims against their religious
employers? Put differently, can religious organizations harass their ministerial employees with
impunity and without fear of legal recourse? Respecting both First Amendment interests and
individual rights, this article appraises and takes seriously the constitutional purpose and
necessity of the ministerial exception. Recognizing that importance, this article nevertheless
rejects a categorical ban on ministerial employees’ hostile work environment claims. Instead,
it proposes a case-by-case analysis of ministerial employees’ hostile work environment claims,
granting all employees possible protection from harassment, regardless of who employs them.
Religious freedom need not close the courthouse doors on hundreds of thousands of
employees. Religious freedom and speculative First Amendment problems need not, and
should not, undermine employees’ rights to dignified workplaces and protection from
workplace harassment.
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INTRODUCTION
“Ministerial employee of a religious organization” evokes an image of a niche category: an
imam at a mosque, a pastor at a church, a rabbi at a synagogue. Despite the tailored category that the
term insinuates, the reality is much broader. Ministerial employees might be nurses, social workers,
math teachers, lawyers, communications personnel, music directors, and camp counselors.1 A 19-year-
old college student spending the summer working as a counselor at their childhood camp does not
evoke an image of a ministerial employee of a religious organization; that does not mean they aren’t
one.
Ministerial employees of religious organizations stand in a unique position. While employees
of secular organizations are protected by a wide array of anti-discrimination laws, these “ministers” –
the camp counselor, social worker, and math teacher referenced above – are unprotected. In 2012 the
Supreme Court first recognized the “ministerial exception.”2 The ministerial exception protects
religious organizations from lawsuits alleging discrimination in the hiring and firing of ministers. This
constitutional exception holds that religious organizations must be free from state interference when
selecting their ministers.
Whether religious organizations should be able to discriminate when hiring their ministers –
the merits of the ministerial exception itself – has been debated for decades.3 This article asks a
different, but related question: Can ministerial employees bring harassment claims against their religious
employers? Alternatively, can religious organizations harass their ministerial employees without legal
consequences? The answer is clear and imperative. Ministerial employees can bring harassment claims
against their religious employers; religious organizations are not free to harass their employees with
impunity with no possibility of legal recourse.
In recent years, Supreme Court jurisprudence has grown exceedingly protective of religious
organizations.4 Drawing on this trajectory, some scholars and advocates have argued that ministerial
employees must be categorically barred from bringing hostile work environment claims against their
religious employers.5 The First Amendment, however, does not require a categorical exclusion of
1 See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S.Ct. 2049, 2082 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
2 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 173 (2012).
3 See, e.g., Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination By Religious
Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514 (1979); Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church
Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373 (1981); Jane Rutherford, Equality As the Primary
Constitutional Value: The Case for Applying Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049 (1996); Marci A.
Hamilton, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2005); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Mystery of
Unanimity in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 20 LEWIS&CLARK L. REV. 1265 (2017).
4 See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 171 (recognizing the ministerial exception); Morrissey-Berru, 140 S.Ct. 2049 (applying
the ministerial exception to lay teachers). Benefits to religious organizations that were once questioned as potential Establishment
Clause problems are now mandated under the Free Exercise Clause. Compare Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002)
(upholding the constitutionality of and permitting, indirect aid to religious schools) with Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia,
Inc. v. Comer, 137 S.Ct. 2012 (2017) (holding that excluding religious organizations from playground grants, even with the
permissible goal of avoiding religious establishment, was a free exercise problem) and Espinoza v. Montana Department of
Revenue, 140 S.Ct. 2246 (2020) (holding that the Free Exercise clause requires state financial assistance to parochial schools at
the same level as other private schools).
5 See, e.g., Brief for the State of Indiana, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petition for Reh’g En Banc, at 5, 6, Demkovich
v. St. Andrew’s the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 973 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-2142) (reasoning that broader religious
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ministerial employees’ hostile work environment claims. Moreover, a categorical exception would be
catastrophic, undermining hundreds of thousands of employees’ rights to dignified workplaces free
from severe or pervasive harassment.6 Sexual harassment, and harassment of all kinds – on the basis of
race, age, disability, or national origin – is endemic in the United States7 and causes egregious and
preventable harm. Ministerial employees’ hostile work environment claims against their religious
employers need not be categorically barred and should not be categorically barred.
Upholding employees’ rights in the face of unlawful harassment and also protecting religious
organizations’ religious freedom is possible. To do so, ministerial employees’ hostile work environment
claims must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. Some cases will, undoubtedly, interfere with a church’s
choice in who communicates their faith or otherwise undermine protected church autonomy. In such
situations, the First Amendment mandates that the case not go forward. In other cases, a hostile work
environment claim may completely fail to implicate a church’s choice in their minister, the church-
minister relationship, or church autonomy. A case-by-case analysis respects both individual rights and
religious freedom. Case-by-case analysis is a modest approach that affords appropriate deference and
respect to religious organizations’ religious exercise; it is not at odds with the Court’s protective
doctrinal trend. This approach allows the courts to embrace a protective jurisprudence without
devastating the rights of, and imposing irremediable harm on, hundreds of thousands of employees.
Part I addresses existing law around the ministerial exception’s application to hostile work
environment claims. In particular, Part I looks to the Supreme Court’s and lower federal courts’
development of the ministerial exception and the Supreme Court’s development of hostile work
environment jurisprudence. Part I then surveys both federal and state court decisions analyzing the
ministerial exception as it applies to ministerial employees’ hostile work environment claims. Part II
addresses the history of the ministerial exception.
Grounded in the preceding law and history, Part III argues that the ministerial exception
should not categorically apply to ministerial employees’ hostile work environment claims against their
religious employers. To make this argument, Part III first posits that hostile work environment claims
fall outside the scope of the ministerial exception’s purpose. From there, Part III demonstrates why a
autonomy principles, such as protecting churches’ rights to supervise and control ministers, shall be upheld when considering
how to apply the ministerial exception). See also Laycock, supra note 3, at 1392 (criticizing case-by-case analysis as inadequately
protective of church autonomy).
6 See Morrissey-Berru, 140 S.Ct. at 2082 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for Virginia et al. as Amici Curiae 33, n.
25); Brief for Prof. Leslie C. Griffin et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 7–9, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (No. 10-533). Religious organizations and advocates are also taking steps to
increase the number and expand the category of employees covered by the ministerial exception, implying that this number will
only grow. See, e.g., McGuireWoods, U.S. Supreme Court BroadensMinisterial Exemption to Employment Discrimination Claims
(July 10, 2020), https://www.mcguirewoods.com/client-resources/Alerts/2020/7/us-supreme-court-broadens-ministerial-
exemption-employment-discrimination-claims[perma.cc/YRG7-FCXU] (providing religious organizations with tips on how to
get their employees covered under the ministerial exception); Mark Dance, Four Key Areas for Protecting Your Ministry From
Lawsuits, FACTS & TRENDS (Aug. 27, 2015), https://factsandtrends.net/2015/08/27/four-keys-areas-for-protecting-your-
ministry-from-lawsuits[perma.cc/S6BD-PXPF]; First Liberty, Religious Liberty Protection Kit for Christian Schools 34, 36
(2016), https://firstliberty.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/RLA_CHRISTIAN_SCHOOLS.pdf[perma.cc/7SEZ-H8AR].
7 See All Charges Alleging Harassment (Charges filed with EEOC) FY 2010-2020, U.S. EQUALEMPLOYMENTOPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/statistics/all-charges-alleging-harassment-charges-filed-eeoc-fy-2010-fy-
2020[perma.cc/6JK7-UHN5] (last visited Mar. 26, 2021) (showing that over 26,000 harassment allegations were filed under all
statutes each year from 2010 to 2018, including sexual harassment charges).
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civil court’s analysis of a hostile work environment claim against a religious employer does not
categorically violate the First Amendment. Finally, Part III concludes by promoting a case-by-case
analysis as the most constitutionally sound approach forward. Part IV offers a brief conclusion.
PART I: EXISTING STATE OF THE LAW
To grapple with the ministerial exception’s application to hostile work environment claims,
we must first explore two distinct areas of law: 1) the ministerial exception and 2) hostile work
environment claims. This part discusses each topic in turn, before looking to the interaction therein.
A. Ministerial Exception
The ministerial exception is a judicially created constitutional exception to employment
discrimination laws.8 Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex and national origin.9 Other applicable laws, like the ADEA and ADA, prohibit
discrimination in employment on the basis of age or disability.10 The ministerial exception is an
affirmative defense to a claim of discrimination in hiring or firing in violation of such statutes.11When
a ministerial employee brings a claim against their religious employer alleging discrimination, the
religious defendant can argue that the claim is barred by the ministerial exception.
The ministerial exception is grounded in the principle of church autonomy.12 The church
autonomy doctrine stems from both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First
Amendment.13 The church autonomy doctrine, broadly construed, aims to protect a church’s “religious
doctrine, polity, and practice” from state interference.14While there are significant limits to the church
autonomy doctrine, the ministerial exception’s protection of a church’s choice of ministers sits
comfortably within a church’s right to autonomy.15
8 See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188. Although initially conceived as an exception to Title VII, see McClure v. Salvation
Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), the ministerial exception now applies to several anti-discrimination laws. See, e.g., Our Lady
of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S.Ct. 2049 (2020) (applying the ministerial exception to an ADA case); Tomic v.
Cath. Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2006) (applying the ministerial exception to an ADEA case).
9 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
10 29 U.S.C. § 623(a); 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
11 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 195 n.4 (“We conclude that the exception operates as an affirmative defense to an
otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar.”).
12 See, e.g., Rosalie Berger Levinson, Gender Equality vs. Religious Autonomy: Suing Religious Employers for Sexual Harassment
After Hosanna-Tabor, 11 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 89, 92 (2015) (“[T]he ministerial exception is a subcategory of the ecclesiastical
abstention or church autonomy doctrine.”).
13 See, e.g., Jarod S. Gonzalez, At the Intersection of Religious Organization Missions and Employment Laws: The Case of Minister
Employment Suits, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 303, 307–08 (2015) (“The exception derives from the First Amendment’s Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses and is grounded on the principle of church autonomy.”).
14 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979). The church autonomy doctrine has also been construed as prohibiting “civil
court review of internal church disputes involving matters of faith, doctrine, church governance, and polity.” Bryce v. Episcopal
Church in the Diocese of Co., 289 F.3d 648, 655 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116–17
(1952)).
15 See, e.g., Joshua D. Dunlap, When Big Brother Plays God: The Religion Clauses, Title VII, and the Ministerial Exception, 82
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2005, 2025 (2007) (“The church autonomy cases, although susceptible to multiple interpretations . . .
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The first court to recognize the ministerial exception was the Fifth Circuit in McClure v.
Salvation Army.16WhenMcClure was decided, a theory of sexual harassment as discrimination cognizable
under Title VII was still years away.17 The McClure court, as will be true for the majority of courts
discussed herein, was focused exclusively on discrimination in tangible employment actions: they
discussed employment decisions like hiring, firing, salary increases, and demotions.18 Between McClure
and the Supreme Court decision in Hosanna-Tabor in 2012,19 the circuit courts uniformly adopted the
ministerial exception.20 In those intervening years, the lower courts applied the ministerial exception to
a wide array of circumstances: cases brought under Title VII,21 the ADA,22 the ADEA,23 and common
law tort and contract claims.24
In Hosanna-Tabor, Cheryl Perich, the employee whose termination was in question, was a
“called” teacher at the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School.25 Perich taught both
secular and religious subjects, led her students in prayer, and occasionally led chapel services. Perich
was not an ordained minister. After a period of disability leave, Perich attempted to return to work.
When the school principal opposed her return and, later, requested Perich’s resignation, Perich brought
a claim to the EEOC, asserting that she was being discriminated against on the basis of her disability.26
Upon her termination, Perich also asserted retaliation for complaining about discrimination, in violation
of the Americans with Disabilities Act.27
The Supreme Court, like all of the circuit courts before it, recognized the ministerial
included ministerial employment decisions as one aspect of church autonomy.”).
16 McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972); Janet S. Belcove-Shalin, Ministerial Exception and Title VII
Claims: Case Law Grid Analysis, 2 NEV. L.J. 107, 109 (2002) (stating that McClure was the first ministerial exception case).
17 Ira C. Lupu, Robert W. Tuttle, #metoo Meets the Ministerial Exception: Sexual Harassment Claims by Clergy and the First
Amendment’s Religion Clauses, 25 WM. &MARY J. RACE, GENDER& SOC. JUST. 249, 269 (2019) (explaining that sexual harassment
was not recognized by the Court as sex discrimination until the 1980s).
18 See generally McClure, 460 F.2d 553.
19 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012).
20 Id. at 188 (“Courts of Appeals have uniformly recognized the existence of a “ministerial exception,” grounded in the
First Amendment”). See, e.g., Combs v. Cent. Tex. Ann. Conf. of United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999); Young
v. Northern Ill. Conf. of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian
Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir. 1991).
21 See, e.g., Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198, 209 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that a priest could not bring a Title VII racial
discrimination claim); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 312 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that a chaplain could not bring a Title
VII sex discrimination claim).
22 See, e.g., Werft v. Desert Sw. Ann. Conf. of United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 2004)
(applying the ministerial exception to a minister’s ADA reasonable accommodation claim).
23 See, e.g., Tomic v. Cath. Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that a music director could not
bring an ADEA claim).
24 See, e.g., Friedlander v. Port Jewish Ctr., 347 F. App’x 654 (2d Cir. 2009) (applying the ministerial exception to dismiss
a rabbi’s breach of contract claim).
25 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 178 (2012).
26 Id. at 179.
27 Id. at 180.
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exception.28 The Court clarified that the exception is an affirmative defense, not a jurisdictional bar,29
and held that both religion clauses of the First Amendment prohibited Perich’s claim from going
forward.30 The Court stated that “[t]he case before us is an employment discrimination suit brought on
behalf of a minister, challenging her church’s decision to fire her. Today we hold only that the
ministerial exception bars such a suit.”31
More recently, the Supreme Court has again addressed the ministerial exception in Our Lady
of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru.32 Morrissey-Berru combined two lower court appeals. The first case
stemmed from a Catholic school teacher, who alleged that she was demoted and her contract was not
renewed because of her age, in violation of the ADEA.33 The second case stemmed from another
Catholic school teacher, who alleged that she was discharged when she requested an accommodation
to receive cancer treatment, in violation of the ADA.34 The Court held that the terminated teachers
were ministers for purposes of the ministerial exception and attempted to clarify how courts may
determine if an employee qualifies as a minister for purposes of the exception.35 Put simply, the Court
stated that “[w]hat matters, at bottom, is what an employee does.”36 This broad “minister” definition
was discussed in depth in Justice Sotomayor’s dissent:
Pause, for a moment, on the Court’s conclusion: Even if the teachers were not
Catholic, and even if they were forbidden to participate in the church’s sacramental
worship, they would nonetheless be “ministers” of the Catholic faith simply because
of their supervisory role over students in a religious school. That stretches the law
and logic past their breaking points. . . . [S]ources tally over a hundred thousand
secular teachers whose rights are at risk. And that says nothing of the rights of
countless coaches, camp counselors, nurses, social-service workers, inhouse lawyers,
media-relations personnel, and many others who work for religious institutions. All
these employees could be subject to discrimination for reasons completely irrelevant
to their employers’ religious tenets. . . . So long as the employer determines that an
employee’s “duties” are “vital” to “carrying out the mission of the church,” then
today’s laissez-faire analysis appears to allow that employer to make employment
decisions because of a person’s skin color, age, disability, sex, or any other protected
trait for reasons having nothing to do with religion.37
28 Id. at 188 (“We agree that there is such a ministerial exception.”).
29 Id. at 195 n.4 (“We conclude that the exception operates as an affirmative defense to an otherwise cognizable claim,
not a jurisdictional bar.”).
30 Id. at 181 (“Both Religion Clauses bar the government from interfering with the decision of a religious group to fire
one of its ministers.”).
31 Id. at 196.
32 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S.Ct. 2049 (2020).
33 Id. at 2058.
34 Id. at 2059.
35 Id. at 2063–64.
36 Id. at 2064.
37 Id. at 2081–82 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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In the short time since Morrissey-Berru, lower courts have applied the Court’s new guidance
and brought Justice Sotomayor’s concerns to fruition. After looking at “what an employee does,” lower
courts have determined that an increasing number and variety of employees constitute ministerial
employees.38
B. Hostile Work Environment Claims
Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.39 In 1986, the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, first recognized
that the creation of a hostile work environment based on protected grounds was actionable as
discrimination under Title VII.40 A hostile work environment is one that is “permeated with
‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult’ that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment.”41 A hostile work
environment claim must satisfy both objective and subjective elements:
the misconduct shown must be ‘severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively
hostile or abusive work environment,’ and the victim must also subjectively perceive
that environment to be abusive.42
Under Title VII, an employer’s liability for sexual harassment can turn on the harasser’s
employment position.43 “If the harassing employee is the victim’s co-worker, the employer is liable only
if it was negligent in controlling working conditions.”44 Where the harasser is a supervisor, however,
the employer is strictly liable if “the supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible employment
action.”45 If no such action was taken, an employer is still liable unless the employer shows that (1) the
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct harassing behavior and (2) the
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of the available remedies.46
Hostile work environment claims allege no such tangible employment actions.47 As a result,
38 See, e.g., Woods v. Seattle’s Union Gospel Mission, 481 P.3d 1060, 1070 (Wash. 2021) (holding that whether a staff
attorney at a religious organization is a “minister” is a question of fact); Koenke v. Saint Joseph’s Univ., No. CV 19-4731, 2021
WL 75778 (E.D. Pa Jan. 8, 2021) (holding that an Assistant Music Director at a Catholic University was a minister and that the
ministerial exception therefore barred all of the plaintiff’s employment discrimination claims); Menard v. Archdiocese of Bos.,
152 N.E.3d 151 (Mass. App. Ct. 2020) (holding that a Music Director was a minister and thus barring her age and gender-based
discrimination claims). But see DeWeese-Boyd v. Gordon Coll., 163 N.E.3d 1000 (2021) (holding that an associate professor of
social work at a Christian liberal arts college was not a minister for purposes of the ministerial exception).
39 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
40 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
41 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 67).
42 Alfano v. Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 374 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21).
43 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. (first citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); then citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998)).
47 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761, 763 (“A tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment status,
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hostile work environment claims caused by supervisor harassment afford the defendant the above
affirmative defense: The defendant must show that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
harassing behavior and the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of the available remedies.48
This defense is commonly called the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense.
While these cases were about hostile work environments created on the basis of sex, the
doctrine and affirmative defense have been extended to hostile work environment claims based on
other Title VII protected grounds.49Moreover, the doctrine has been extended to federal statutes other
than Title VII that protect employees from discrimination based on age50 and disability.51 Hostile work
environment claims brought under these statutes follow the same doctrinal analysis.
C. The Ministerial Exception’s Application to Hostile Work Environment Claims
The ministerial exception has been widely studied: The Supreme Court has ruled on the issue
twice, lower court cases are abundant, and scholars have spent significant time and ink on the topic.52
So too have hostile work environment claims received significant, and warranted, attention.53 The
interaction between the ministerial exception and hostile work environment claims, however, remains
widely unexamined.54 The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this issue,55 and lower court cases remain
such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a
significant change in benefits.”); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 786.
48 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08.
49 Vance, 570 U.S. at 429 n.3 (citing Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 186 n.9 (4th Cir. 2001)) (noting that
several “federal courts of appeals have held that Faragher and Ellerth apply to other types of hostile environment claims,” and
assuming without deciding that the affirmative defense applies to race-based hostile work environment claims).
50 See, e.g., Stapp v. Curry Cty. Bd. Of Cty. Comm’rs, 672 Fed. App’x 841, 846 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding that “the
Ellerth/Faragher defense applies in [Age Discrimination in Employment Act] cases.”).
51 See, e.g., Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 804 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that a plaintiff alleging a violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) must “follow the methodology already established in the parallel area of Title VII
litigation,” including the Fargher Ellerth affirmative defense).
52 See, e.g., The Ministerial Exception to Title VII: The Case for A Deferential Primary Duties Test, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1776
(2008); J. Gregory Grisham & Daniel Blomberg, The Ministerial Exception After Hosanna-Tabor: Firmly Founded, Increasingly Refined,
20 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 80 (2019).
53 See, e.g., Christine Neagle, An Analysis of the Applicability of Hostile Work Environment Liability to the ADA, 3 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 715 (2001); Margaret M. Gembala, ADEA and the Hostile Work Environment Claim: Are the Circuit Courts Dragging
Their Feet at the Expense of the Harassed Older Worker?, 7 ELDER L.J. 341 (1999); Rebecca Hanner White, Title VII and the #MeToo
Movement, 68 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 1014 (2018).
54 Several articles about the ministerial exception briefly discuss hostile work environment claims. See e.g., Renee M.
Williams, The Ministerial Exception and Disability Discrimination Claims, 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 423, 436 (2011) (devoting a section
to the topic); Belcove-Shalin, supra note 16. There is very little scholarship devoted entirely to the topic. See generally Lupu &
Tuttle, supra note 17; Ryan W. Jaziri, Fixing A Crack in the Wall of Separation: Why the Religion Clauses Preclude Adjudication of Sexual
Harassment Claims Brought by Ministers, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 719 (2011); Levinson, supra note 12.
55 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 258 (“sexual harassment claims present a mixture of concerns sounding in both
tort and contract. Unlike the typical ministerial exception case, which involves an adverse job action by the employer against a
person in ministry, the questions raised by claims of pervasive and hostile work environment are not about the complainant’s
fitness for the position. Hosanna-Tabor thus leaves wide open the question[].”). In Prince of Peace Lutheran Church v. Linklater, 28
A.3d 1171 (Md. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 937 (2012), the Supreme Court had the opportunity to weigh in on the issue but
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limited in number.
The most recent appellate court case on the topic is Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Parish,
Calumet City.56 As of the time of writing, only the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits had addressed this
question directly.57Other than Demkovich, all federal appellate court decisions on the topic were decided
prior to both Morrissey-Berru and Hosanna-Tabor and therefore lack the benefit of these Supreme Court
precedents. A far greater number of federal district courts58 and state appellate courts59 have addressed
this question. This section will look first at Demkovich before turning to Ninth and Tenth Circuit
precedent. This section will also briefly address a few district court and state court decisions, to provide
a full picture of existing law.
1. Seventh Circuit60
In July 2021, the en banc Seventh Circuit held that a choir director’s suit against his religious
employer, claiming that he was harassed on the basis of his sexuality and disability, was barred by the
ministerial exception.61 The procedural history leading up to that decision is worth considering.
In his initial complaint, Demkovich alleged that he was terminated from his position as choir
director at St. Andrew’s because of his disability and sexuality.62 The district court dismissed the case
without prejudice,63 giving Demkovich the opportunity to amend his complaint. In his amended
complaint, Demkovich alleged that he had been subject to a hostile work environment on account of
his disability and sexuality.64Demkovich claimed that his supervisor repeatedly and regularly humiliated
refrained from doing so.
56 Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 3 F.4th 968 (7th Cir. 2021).
57 Id.; Bollard v. California Province of the Society of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999); Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian
Church, 375 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2004); Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2010). In Rojas
v. Catholic Diocese of Rochester, the District Court for the Western District of New York held that the ministerial exception did not
apply to a hostile work environment claim brought by a minister against her church. On appeal, the Second Circuit failed to
directly address the ministerial exception’s application to hostile work environment claims. Rojas v. Roman Cath. Diocese of
Rochester, 660 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2011).
58 See, e.g., Smith v. Raleigh District of N.C. Conference of United Methodist Church, 63 F. Supp. 2d 694 (E.D.N.C.
1999); Dolquist v. Heartland Presbytery, 342 F. Supp. 2d 996 (D. Kan. 2004); Bohnert v. Roman Cath. Archbishop of S.F., 136
F. Supp. 3d 1094 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Middleton v. United Church of Christ Bd., 483 F. Supp. 3d 489 (N.D. Ohio 2020).
59 See, e.g., Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (interpreting the Minnesota Constitution); Van
Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122 (Colo. 1996); Weaver v. African Methodist Episcopal Church, 54 S.W.3d 575 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001);
McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840 (N.J. 2002).
60 This section will be discussing only Demkovich. The Seventh Circuit arguably addressed this question in Alicea-
Hernandez v. Cath. Bishop of Chi. as well. Alicea-Hernandez v. Cath. Bishop of Chi., 320 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003). Though the facts
of that case included some harassment, the court was asked only whether a minister’s claim that she was constructively discharged
on the basis of age and gender was barred by the ministerial exception. Because the court was never asked, and subsequently
never answered, the question raised in this article, this decision will not be discussed in depth.
61 Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 3 F.4th 968 (7th Cir. 2021).
62 Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., No. 1:16-cv-11576, 2017 WL 4339817, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2017).
63 Id. at *7.
64 Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., 343 F. Supp. 3d 772, 776 (N.D. Ill. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom.
Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 973 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2020), reh’g en banc granted, vacated (Dec. 9, 2020)
(“In contrast to the original complaint, which sought relief arising from the firing, he now seeks damages caused by the emotional
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him based on his weight and his diabetes.65 He also claimed that his supervisor regularly spoke of
Demkovich’s “fag wedding” and called him and his husband “bitches.”66
The District Court dismissed Demkovich’s claims of discrimination on the basis of sexuality
and allowed the discrimination on the basis of disability to go forward.67 The court reasoned that
because the church offered religious justification for the supervisor’s sexuality-based harassment,
allowing that claim to go forward would impermissibly entangle the court in religious questions.68 The
court held that the harassment because of Demkovich’s diabetes did not pose a similar entanglement
problem.69 The ministerial exception “does not categorically bar hostile work environment claims that
do not seek relief for a tangible employment action. Instead, those types of claims (like the one
presented here) must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis for excessive intrusion on the religious
institution’s First Amendment rights.”70
The defendants appealed, and the Seventh Circuit heard the case. The certified question
before the court was:
[S]hould the constitutional exemption be extended to categorically bar all hostile
environment discrimination claims by ministerial employees, even where there is no
challenge to tangible employment actions like hiring and firing?71
The Seventh Circuit answered with a resounding “no.”72 The alleged harassment was not
necessary to control or supervise the ministerial employee. Because the harassment did not implicate
the church’s control or supervision, it did not fall within the ministerial exception.73 The court explained
that “[s]upervisors within religious organizations have no constitutionally protected individual rights
under Hosanna-Tabor to abuse those employees they manage.”74 Neither the Free Exercise Clause nor
Establishment Clause mandates categorical exception.75 The defendants filed a motion for a rehearing
distress, mental anguish, and physical ailments he allegedly suffered from the hostile work environment.”).
65 Id. at 777 (“On the disability-discrimination claims, Demkovich alleges that he was frequently harassed because of
his diabetes and a metabolic syndrome. Reverend Dada made harassing remarks about Demkovich’s weight, often urging him to
walk Dada’s dog to lose weight, and telling Demkovich that he needed to lose weight because Dada did not want to preach at
his funeral. Dada also repeatedly complained about the cost of keeping Demkovich on the parish’s health and dental insurance
plans because of his weight and diabetes. In 2012, when Demkovich declined a dinner invitation from Dada because he did not
have his insulin with him, Dada asked if Demkovich was diabetic and told him that he needed to ‘get his weight under control’
to help eliminate his need for insulin.”).
66 Id. at 776–77.
67 Id. at 776.
68 Id. at 786–87.
69 Id. at 788.
70 Id. at 776.
71 Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 973 F.3d 718, 720 (7th Cir. 2020), reh’g en banc granted,
vacated (Dec. 9, 2020).
72 Id. (“Our answer is no.”).
73 Id. at 729.
74 Id. at 730.
75 Id. at 732.
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en banc that was granted in December 2020.76 The Seventh Circuit decision was accordingly vacated
and oral argument for the rehearing en banc took place remotely on February 9, 2021.77
The en banc Seventh Circuit held that hostile work environment claims stemming from
minister-on-minister harassment are categorically barred.78 The court reasoned that the purpose of the
ministerial exception is to protect the church-minister and minister-minister relationship.79Accordingly,
religious supervision and interaction between ministers sits at the core of what the ministerial exception
protects. The court continued that inquiry into the appropriateness of a minister’s work environment,
a necessary question in a hostile work environment claim, is necessarily a religious question.80 Courts
cannot answer religious questions; such claims are categorically barred from civil court adjudication and
intrusion.
2. Ninth Circuit
In Bollard v. California Province of the Society of Jesus, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the
ministerial exception applied when a seminarian student – a minister for purposes of the exception –
alleged a hostile work environment on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII.81 The court held that
the “scope of the ministerial exception to Title VII is limited to what is necessary to comply with the
First Amendment.”82 Because the religious organization did not offer a religious justification for the
hostile environment,83 there is “no danger” that secular courts will be thrust into the “constitutionally
untenable position” of answering “questions of religious faith or doctrine.”84 The court buttressed its
position by noting that the creation of a hostile work environment does not implicate the religious
organization’s choice of representatives,85 a decision for which the court “would simply defer without
76 Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City, No. 19-2142 (7th Cir. Dec. 9, 2020) (order granting petition
for rehearing en banc).
77 Id.; Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City, No. 19-2142 (7th Cir. Dec. 17, 2020) (notice of oral
argument).
78 Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 3 F.4th 968, 979 (7th Cir. 2021) (“Precluding hostile work
environment claims arising from minister-on-minister harassment also fits within the doctrinal framework of the ministerial
exception.”).
79 Id. at 977–78 (discussing “a religious organization’s constitutionally protected relationship with its ministers” and “a
religious organization’s independence in its ministerial relationships”). See also id. at 979 (stating that the relationship between
ministers is a religious organization’s “backbone”).
80 Id. at 979 (“To render a legal judgment about Demkovich’s work environment is to render a religious judgment about
how ministers interact.”).
81 Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 1999).
82 Id. at 947.
83 Id. (“In this case, as in the case of lay employees, the Free Exercise rationales supporting an exception to Title VII
are missing. The Jesuits do not offer a religious justification for the harassment Bollard alleges; indeed, they condemn it as
inconsistent with their values and beliefs.”); but see Jaziri, supra note 54, at 746 (explaining that “Bollard and Elvig implicate that, if
a church doctrinally justifies sexual harassment, it would be protected under the First Amendment”); See discussion infra Part III,
Section B.
84 Bollard, 196 F.3d at 947.
85 Id. (“That Bollard has sued under an employment discrimination statute does not mean that the aspect of the church-
minister employment relationship that warrants heightened constitutional protection—a church’s freedom to choose its
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol25/iss1/3
WHENHARASSMENT ATWORK ISHARASSMENT AT CHURCH
23
further inquiry.”86 Turning to the Establishment Clause, the Bollard court held that the “limited nature
of the inquiry, combined with the ability of the district court to control discovery,” suffices to prevent
excessive entanglement with religion.87With no Free Exercise nor Establishment Clause problem, the
Ninth Circuit allowed the claim to go forward.
In 2004, the Ninth Circuit reiterated its position in Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church.88 There,
the court dismissed claims alleging a tangible employment action as impermissible under the First
Amendment,89 but held that hostile work environment claims that were not connected to the tangible
employment decisions could go forward.90 The court stated that “insulating the Church’s employment
decisions does not foreclose Elvig from holding the Church vicariously liable for the alleged sexual
harassment itself, which is not a protected employment decision.”91 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that
redress for impermissible harassment was possible without “attaching liability to ministerial
employment decisions protected by the First Amendment.”92 The court held that 1) demonstrating that
the plaintiff was harassed and 2) showing that the harassment was sufficiently severe to alter the terms
or conditions of employment both involved only permissible, secular inquiry.93
The Elvig court also addressed the contention that the reasonableness prong of the Faragher-
Ellerth affirmative defense, as applied to a religious employer, would violate the First Amendment.94
The court, holding that the affirmative defense does not categorically violate the First Amendment,
explained that the “reasonableness component . . . evaluates an employer’s actions in responding to
sexual harassment rather than the motivations for that response . . . In short, the issue is what the
Church did.”95 This, the court continued, can be subjected to entirely secular ⎯ and constitutional⎯
legal analysis.96
3. Tenth Circuit
In Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, the Tenth Circuit held that allowing hostile
work environment claims by ministers against their religious employers would violate the First
Amendment.97 The court held that hostile work environment claims “implicate a church’s spiritual
functions,” and allowing such claims “may . . . ‘involve gross substantive and procedural entanglement
representatives—is present.”).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 950.
88 Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951(9th Cir. 2004).
89 Id. at 958.
90 Id. at 962 (“[P]laintiffs who suffer tangible employment actions but cannot connect those actions to harassment may
nonetheless recover for the harassment itself if their employers cannot satisfy the Ellerth/ Faragher affirmative defense.”).
91 Id. See also id. at 963 (“[D]ecisions to engage in and permit harassment are insufficient to trigger the ministerial
exception.”).
92 Id. at 953.
93 Id. at 959.
94 Id. at 963–64.
95 Id. at 963 (emphasis in original).
96 Id. at 963–64.
97 Skrzypczak v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1245 (10th Cir. 2010).
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with the Church’s core functions, its polity, and its autonomy.’”98 Such excessive entanglement with
religion would violate the Establishment Clause.99 The court continued that allowing such claims would
also violate the Free Exercise Clause because it would “infringe on a church’s ‘right to select, manage,
and discipline [its] clergy free from government control and scrutiny’ by influencing it to employ
ministers that lower its exposure to liability rather than” ministers who further its religious goals.100
4. District Courts101
In Dolquist v. Heartland Presbytery, the District Court for the District of Kansas held that an
ordained minister’s sexual harassment claim against her religious employer did not violate the First
Amendment.102 The court noted that it would only need to inquire into “the nature and severity of the
alleged harassment, whether defendant knew of the harassment and whether defendant adequately
responded to such notice.”103 None of these questions, the court continued, involved the “defendant’s
right to select clergy or decide matters of church government, faith and doctrine.”104 The court further
held that allowing hostile work environment claims “will result in no greater entanglement in church
affairs” than cases in which parishioners sue a church for the negligent supervision of ministers who
engaged in sexual misconduct,105 or cases in which non-ministers sue for sexual harassment.106 Both
such cases are permissible under the Establishment Clause, thus ministers’ hostile work environment
claims are also permissible.107
In Rojas v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester, the District Court for the Western District of New
98 Id. (quoting Elvig, 375 F.3d at 976 (Trott, J., dissenting)).
99 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)(“[W]e conclude that the cumulative impact of the entire
relationship arising under the statutes in each State involves excessive entanglement between government and religion.”).
100 Skrzypczak, 611 F.3d at 1245 (quoting Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790, 803 (9th Cir.2005) (order
denying petition for rehearing) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting)).
101 This section does not provide a complete picture of all district court decisions touching on the application of the
ministerial exception to hostile work environment claims. This section does, however, present selected district court decisions to
afford a more robust vision of the current jurisprudence around this issue. The selected cases demonstrate common arguments
on either side of the issue and serve as examples of the relatively few federal district court cases on the topic.
102 Dolquist v. Heartland Presbytery, 342 F.Supp.2d 996, 1007 (D. Kansas 2004).
103 Id. (citing Ammon v. Baron Auto. Group, 270 F.Supp.2d 1293, 1306–09 (D. Kan. 2003)).
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. (citing Smith v. Raleigh District of N.C. Conf. of United Methodist, 63 F.Supp.2d 694, 710–18 (E.D.N.C.
1999)(“Because plaintiff’s claims present secular, rather than ecclesiastical, disputes, the court can resolve the claims by reference
to neutral principles of law.”). See alsoMalicki v. Doe, 814 So.2d 347, 360–65 (Fla. 2002) (holding that “the Free Exercise Clause
is not implicated in this case because the conduct sought to be regulated . . . is not rooted in religious belief”).
107 See, e.g., Shawna Meyer Eikenberry, Note, Thou Shalt Not Sue the Church: Denying Court Access to Ministerial Employees,
74 IND. L.J. 269, 290–91 (1998) (citing Smith v. O’Connell, 986 F.Supp. 73, 79 (D.R.I. 1997) (stating “the well-established
principal that neutral laws of general application do not violate the First Amendment simply because they have the incidental
effect of burdening a particular religious practice.”); See also, Jessica R. Vartanian, Note, Confessions of the Church: Discriminatory
Practices By Religious Employers and Justifications for a More Narrow Ministerial Exception, 40 U.TOL.L.REV. 1049, 1066 (2009) (“Allowing
sexual-abuse claims while precluding sexual-harassment claims based on the ministerial exception would lead to an absurd
result.”)); Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of N.C. Conf. of United Methodist Church, 63 F. Supp. 2d 694, 705, 710 (E.D.N.C. 1999)
(holding that a non-minister’s hostile work environment suit was not barred by the First Amendment).
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York held that there is no per se bar prohibiting a ministerial employee from bringing a hostile work
environment claim against their religious employer.108 The court relied on a case-by-case inquiry and
found that the court could adequately control discovery to prevent excessive entanglement.109 In
contrast, in Preece v. Covenant Presbyterian Church, the District Court for the District of Nebraska held that
a ministerial employee’s hostile work environment claim did violate the First Amendment.110 The court
held that the church’s alleged harassment implicated “internal church decision and management, rather
than the outward physical acts of one pastor.”111 Relying on the Supreme Court’s distinction between
outward physical acts – like ingesting peyote – and internal church decisions,112 the court found that
reviewing the sexual harassment claim would excessively entangle a secular court with religion.113
In Koenke v. Saint Joseph’s University,114 one of the few cases decided with the benefit of both
Hosanna-Tabor andMorrissey-Berru, the court held that “hostile work environment claims are employment
discrimination claims, and Title VII and Title IX are federal statutes governing, inter alia, employment
relationships. Consequently, hostile work environment claims, particularly those brought pursuant to
Title VII or Title IX, clearly fall within the scope of cases banned by the ministerial exception.”115 The
Koenke court, relying on Morrissey-Berru, held that hostile work environment claims are categorically
barred.116
5. State Courts117
In Black v. Snyder, the Minnesota high court allowed a minister to proceed with sexual
harassment claims118 against her religious employer, holding that neither the First Amendment nor the
Minnesota Constitution barred such claims.119 The court held that sexual harassment claims, even those
108 Rojas v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Rochester, 557 F. Supp. 2d 387, 399 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that “there is no
evidence to support Defendant’s argument that consideration of Plaintiff’s hostile environment claims would necessarily involve
entanglement with religious doctrine,” and that “there is no per se rule” preventing such suits) (emphasis in original).
109 Id.
110 Preece v. Covenant Presbyterian Church, 2015 WL 1826231, at *19 (D. Neb. April 22, 2015).
111 Id. at *7.
112 Id. at *6 (quoting Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 190 (2012)) (“[T]he
[Hosanna-Tabor] Court contrasted the employment discrimination suit with cases involving law violations ‘of only outward
physical acts’. . . . [T]he Court noted ‘a church’s selection of its ministers is unlike an individual’s ingestion of peyote [because
the employment relationship] concerns government interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and
mission of the church itself.’”).
113 Preece, 2015 WL at *7.
114 Koenke v. Saint Joseph’s Univ., 2021 WL 75778 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2021).
115 Id. at *3.
116 Id. (“The Supreme Court has not cabined the ministerial exception to tangible or intangible employment actions,
and it is not for this Court to create such an exception to binding precedent.”).
117 Like above, this section is not a comprehensive survey of all state court decisions on this topic. Cases were selected
based on their influence in the literature and on other cases, their unique approaches to the topic, and their additions to the
jurisprudential picture.
118 Note that the sexual harassment claims in this case were based on state causes of action. Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.
2d 715, 718 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
119 Id.
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brought by ministers, pose “no greater conflict with the church’s disciplinary authority than that
presented in cases enforcing child abuse laws.”120 The court continued that the sexual harassment claim
would not involve “scrutiny of church doctrine, interfere in matters of an inherently ecclesiastical
nature, or infringe upon the church’s religious practice,” so there was no constitutional bar.121 The
Colorado Supreme Court relied on Black in similarly holding that a hostile work environment claim
“might [survive] a First Amendment bar.”122 The Maryland high court also relied on Black to permit a
sexual harassment claim by a ministerial employee.123
In McKelvey v. Pierce, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a minister is not categorically
barred from bringing a sexual harassment suit against his church.124 The McKelvey court went a step
further, recognizing that immunizing religious organizations from such suits “may actually support the
establishment of religion,” by excepting, and thereby helping to promote, religion.125 The court
concluded that such immunization would, accordingly, pose a First Amendment problem.
Contrary to the above, in Temple Emanuel of Newton v. Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts applied the ministerial exception to a hostile
work environment claim.126 The court noted, however, that the parties had “not argued that the
ministerial exception applies differently – or does not apply at all – to claims of harassment.”127 Because
the issue was not raised or briefed, the court would “not decide whether the ministerial exception
applies to harassment claims.”128
PART II: HISTORY
The history of the Religion Clauses is fraught and highly contentious.129 Consequently, the
120 Id. (citing State v. Motherwell, 788 P.2d 1066, 1073–74 (1990)).
121 Id. at 721.
122 Van Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122 n.11 (Colo. 1996). See also id. at 1135 (Mullarkey, J., concurring) (holding that a
hostile work environment “analysis does not require inquiry into intrinsically ecclesiastical concerns as would be the case if a
court examined minister hiring and discharge decision-making . . . Evaluation of whether a hostile work environment exists does
not impinge on core religious beliefs such that either the free exercise of religion is affected or there is threat of excessive
governmental entanglement. The First Amendment defense to a claim based on a hostile work environment caused by sexual
harassment must fail.”).
123 Prince of Peace Lutheran Church v. Linklater, 28 A.3d 1171 (Md. 2011).
124 McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840 (N.J. 2002). Although these were state law claims, the court stated that the case
“differs from a Title VII action in form, although the underlying wrongful conduct is alleged to be the same. Clearly, as in a Title
VII case, McKelvey can attempt to prove that he was sexually harassed by defendants, resulting in his leaving the seminary before
he could be considered for ordination.” Id. at 858.
125 Id. at 857 (citing Zanita E. Fenton, Faith in Justice: Fiduciaries, Malpractice & Sexual Abuse by Clergy, 8 MICH. J. GENDER
& L. 45, 75 (2001)). See also Prince of Peace, 28 A.3d at 1184 (“Declining to impose neutral and otherwise applicable tort or contract
obligations on religious institutions and ministers may actually support the establishment of religion, because to do so effectively
creates an exception for, and may thereby help promote, religion.”).
126 Temple Emanuel of Newton v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 975 N.E.2d 433 (Mass 2012).
127 Id. at 444 n.10.
128 Id. (citing Williams v. Episcopal Diocese of Mass., 436 Mass. 574, 582–583, 766 N.E.2d 820 (2002)). See alsoMenard
v. Archdiocese of Boston, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 144 (July 29, 2020).
129 See generallyMark David Hall, Jeffersonian Walls and Madisonian Lines: The Supreme Court’s Use of History in Religion Clause
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history of the church autonomy doctrine and, by extension, the ministerial exception, is similarly
contentious.130 An authoritative history is beyond the scope of this article. This part, however, briefly
spells out two dominant theories of the history of the relevant doctrine, as articulated in Hosanna-Tabor
and subsequent commentary therein.
InHosanna-Tabor, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the court, posited a history of the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment.131 In his account, the Chief Justice spoke of the Church of England’s
extensive control over religion. He explained that the early Puritan colonists were fleeing England in
hopes of “elect[ing] their own ministers and establish[ing] their own modes of worship.”132 The
Religion Clauses were drafted with this strongly held hope in mind; the Religion Clauses aimed to
effectuate that goal.133 The Chief Justice buttressed this understanding of history with a letter from
then-Secretary of State James Madison, writing to a Catholic bishop.134 Responding to the bishop’s
request for the President’s “sentiments” regarding the selection of religious leaders,135 Madison wrote,
in relevant part:
[A]s the case is entirely ecclesiastical, it is deemed most congenial with the scrupulous
policy of the Constitution in guarding against a political interference with religious
affairs, to decline the explanations which you have thought might enable you to
accommodate the better, the execution of your trust, to the public advantage.136
In 1806, it was self-evident to Madison that the Constitution forbade the government from
interfering with purely ecclesiastical matters, intruding into religious affairs, or weighing in on
ministerial selection.137 It was this historical picture that justified the Court’s recognition of the
Cases, 85 OR. L. REV. 563 (2006) (reviewing the conflicting use of history in the Supreme Court’s religion clause jurisprudence);
Steven K. Green, “Bad History” : The Lure of History in Establishment Clause Adjudication, 81 NOTREDAME L. REV. 1717 (2006).
130 Compare Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 182–84 (2012) with Leslie C.
Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981, 989 (2013); Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (1961).
131 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 182–184.
132 Id. at 182 (citing T. Curry, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (1986)); McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1409, 1422 (1990)).
133 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 184 (“By forbidding the ‘establishment of religion’ and guaranteeing the ‘free exercise
thereof,’ the Religion Clauses ensured that the new Federal Government —unlike the English Crown—would have no role in
filling ecclesiastical offices. The Establishment Clause prevents theGovernment from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise
Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select their own.”).
134 Id. (citing Letter from James Madison to Bishop Carroll (Nov. 20, 1806), reprinted in 20 Records of the American
Catholic Historical Society 63–64 (1909)).
135 Letter from James Madison to Bishop Carroll (Nov. 20, 1806), reprinted in 20 Records of the American Catholic
Historical Society 63–64 (1909) (“I have had the honor to receive and lay before the President your letter of the 17th. inst;
inclosing a duplicate of the Commission which places under your care the Roman Catholic Church at New Orleans, and
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ministerial exception in Hosanna-Tabor.
An alternative view of the Religion Clauses holds that their historical goal was to protect
individual freedom of religion from institutional intrusion.138 Worded differently, this view holds that
the Religion Clauses were not primarily concerned with protecting the power of religious institutions;
their concern was toleration and individual religious freedom.139 The argument continues that, if the
Religion Clauses protect individual religious freedom, interpreting them to protect “religious
institutions’ rights against their members” is incoherent.140 A broad ministerial exception protects
religious institutions at the expense of religious individuals; that is disconsonant with the history of the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.
These oversimplified accounts are but two of many views of the history of the Religion
Clauses.141 Both accounts respond directly to the question of whether the ministerial exception follows
from the history and purpose of the Clauses. Moreover, both accounts are plausible. Part III will dive
deeper into the purpose of the ministerial exception with these historical pictures in mind.
PART III: THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION SHOULD NOT CATEGORICALLY BAR
MINISTERIAL EMPLOYEES’ HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT CLAIMS AGAINST
THEIR RELIGIOUS EMPLOYERS.
This part will argue, first, that the purpose of the ministerial exception fails to cover hostile
work environment claims. Although the purpose of the exception is disputed, hostile work
environment claims are outside the scope of both probable purposes. Because the goal of the exception
fails to cover such claims, they must not be categorically excepted. This part will then turn to whether
a court’s analysis of a ministerial employee’s hostile work environment claim would itself violate the
First Amendment. Looking to both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, this part will argue
that court analysis does not categorically violate the First Amendment. Because hostile work
environment claims are essentially tortious and can be analyzed using neutral principles of law, civil
court adjudication does not necessarily violate the First Amendment. Case-by-case analysis is the only
constitutionally sound path forward.
A. Hostile work environment claims do not implicate the purpose of the ministerial exception.
There are two frequently cited purposes of the ministerial exception. The first possible
138 See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 130, at 989; Kurland, supra note 130, at 1,4 (“Limited powers of government were not
instituted to expand the realm of power of religious organizations, but rather in favor of freedom of action and thought by the
people.”).
139 See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 130, at 989 (quoting Gordon S. Wood, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THEEARLY
REPUBLIC, 1789-1815, 576 (2009); Frank Lambert, THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN AMERICA 180
(2003)) (“‘The American Revolution broke many of the intimate ties that had traditionally linked religion and government . . .
and turned religion into a voluntary affair, a matter of individual free choice.’ Americans of that era ‘believed that the individual,
not the state or the church, should decide matters of faith.’ Thus, [a] . . . lesson of English and American history is that courts
should not select a legal rule that automatically favors powerful institutions over individuals as the ministerial exception does.”).
140 Id.
141 See generally Hall, supra note 129 (reviewing the many views of history in the Supreme Court’s religion clause
jurisprudence).
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purpose stems from Hosanna-Tabor directly. In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court stated that the purpose of the
exception is to ensure that the “authority to select and control who will minister the faith – a matter
‘strictly ecclesiastical,’ – is the church’s alone.”142 We will call this first purpose “Selection and
Control.”143 Both of the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses protect a church’s authority to
independently select and control who will communicate the faith.144 Under the Selection and Control
view, the ministerial exception is a narrow exception to laws otherwise applicable to religious employers,
and thus must be tailored to this constitutional restriction.145 Tangible employment actions fall within
this purpose.146 The Court in Morrissey-Berru used slightly different language, stating that the ministerial
exception was recognized to preserve a religious organization’s authority to “select, supervise, and if
necessary, remove a minister without interference by secular authorities.”147 Based on the language of
the two Supreme Court cases addressing the ministerial exception, the Selection and Control purpose
can alternatively be called “Selection and Supervision.” In practice, the language of “control” vs.
“supervision” has been used interchangeably and has not significantly altered courts’ or scholars’
understanding of the ministerial exception.148 This part will similarly utilize both terms.
We will call the second possible purpose the “Church-Minister Relationship” view. This view
142 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 194–95 (2012) (quoting Kedroff v.
St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952)).
143 See Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597, 621 (Ky. 2014) (“In the future, when faced with
making a determination of whether the ministerial exception should apply, trial courts should focus on the purpose of the
ministerial exception: to allow a religious institution, free of government intervention, to exercise its right to choose who will
play an integral role in the presentation of its tenets. If the elements of the presented claim do not result in governmental violation
of this purpose, the claim should proceed.”); see also Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir.
1999) (“That Bollard has sued under an employment discrimination statute does not mean that the aspect of the church-minister
employment relationship that warrants heightened constitutional protection—a church’s freedom to choose its representatives—
is present. The Free Exercise Clause rationale for protecting a church’s personnel decisions concerning its ministers is the
necessity of allowing the church to choose its representatives using whatever criteria it deems relevant.”).
144 See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 287.
145 See, e.g., Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he scope of the
ministerial exception to Title VII is limited to what is necessary to comply with the First Amendment.”); Petruska v. Gannon
Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 305 n.8 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320 (2006))
(“[A] narrow exception to prevent the unconstitutional enforcement of Title VII is the proper remedy.”).
146 See Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 3 F.4th 968, 990 (7th Cir. 2021) (Hamilton, J.,
dissenting) (“To answer whether this additional immunity from hostile environment claims is necessary, we should start with
powers that are undisputed: the powers churches already have to select and control their ministers, free of constraints from
employment discrimination and other laws. Hiring, firing, promoting, retiring, transferring—these are decisions that employers,
including religious organizations, make to select those who carry out their work. The latent power to take such actions offers
other tools for control. Further control is available through many other tangible employment actions, including decisions about
compensation, benefits, working conditions, resources available to do the job, training, support from other staff and volunteers,
and so on.”).
147 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S.Ct. 2049, 2060 (2020).
148 See Demkovich, 973 F.3d at 720, 727–731 (relying on both theHosanna-Tabor andMorrissey-Berru language); Koenke v.
Saint Joseph’s Univ., 2021 WL 75778 (E.D. Pa Jan. 8, 2021) (discussing both “control” and “supervision” without differentiating
the terms). The definition of “control” is broader than the definition of “supervision.” See Control, MERRIAM WEBSTER
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003); Supervision, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003). The Court used the term
“supervision” in the later case, Morrissey-Berru, implying a weaker form of oversight. This article nonetheless contends with both
“supervision,” and the stronger term, “control.”
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holds that the “primary purpose of the ministerial exception is to protect religious organizations from
interference with the church-minister relationship, which is at the very core of religious freedom.”149
In Morrissey-Berru, the Court explained that the protection of a church’s authority to select, supervise,
and remove a minister is grounded in the “general principle of church autonomy.”150 That general
principle protects “independence in matters of faith and doctrine and in closely linked matters of
internal government.”151 The Church-Minister Relationship view holds that the ministerial exception is
a broad protection of the church-minister relationship because that relationship is core to a church’s
autonomy and internal ecclesiastic governance.
The Selection and Control view of the ministerial exception is on firmer ground than the
Church-Minister Relationship view. In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court held only that the ministerial exception
bars an “employment discrimination suit brought on behalf of a minister, challenging her church’s
decision to fire her.”152 The Court “express[ed] no view on whether the exception bars other types of
suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious
employers.”153 The inaccuracy of the Church-Minister Relationship view is demonstrated by the claims
a ministerial employee can constitutionally bring against their religious employer. A minister can sue
under many common law torts.154 Some permissible tort claims, however, seem to implicate the church-
minister relationship. If protecting that relationship is the core purpose underscoring the ministerial
exception, why would such ministerial tort claims be permitted but Title VII claims barred? This
distinction can be explained only by the Selection and Control view: Tort claims do not categorically
implicate the selection and control of ministerial employees, whereas discrimination in hiring claims
necessarily implicate selection and control. If the ministerial exception protected the church-minister
149 Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2, Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., 973 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-2142)
(citing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 194–95 (2012)). See also Demkovich v. St.
Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 3 F.4th 968, 977–78 (7th Cir. 2021); Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The
Constitutionality of the Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965, 1978–79 (2007) (citing Douglas
Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM.
L. REV. 1373, 1403 (1981)) (explaining Laycock’s analogous view of the purpose of the exception).
150 Morrissey-Berru, 140 S.Ct. at 2061.
151 Id.
152 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196.
153 Id.
154 See McRaney v. N. Am. Mission Bd. of the S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 966 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2020) (allowing an
executive director’s claims for intentional interference with business relationships, defamation, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress to go forward); Kavanagh v. Zwilling, 997 F. Supp. 2d 241, 254–55 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, 578 F. App’x 24 (2d
Cir. 2014) (analyzing a minister’s libel claim against his church); Marshall v. Munro, 845 P.2d 424, 428 (Alaska 1993) (allowing a
minister’s tort claims of defamation and interference with contract to go forward); Weaver v. Afr. Methodist Episcopal Church,
Inc., 54 S.W.3d 575, 586 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (allowing a minister’s battery claim against her church). See also Carl H. Esbeck,
Tort Claims against Churches and Ecclesiastical Officers: The First Amendment Considerations, 89 W.VA. L. REV. 1, 76–77 (1986) (explaining
that ministers’ tort claims are analyzed case-by-case, and asserting that “there can be little question that religious officers and
organizations are liable in tort for assault, battery, false imprisonment, and the like”); Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor,
88 IND. L.J. 981, 1013 (2013) (first quoting Guerrier v. S. New England Conf. Ass’n of Seventh Day Adventists, Inc., No.
CV085007824, 2009 WL 4282894, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 2009) (“[T]he ministerial exception ‘plainly [did] not create
for religious institutions a charmed existence free from liability for their torts and upon their valid contracts.’”)); then quoting
Friedlander v. Port Jewish Ctr., 588 F. Supp. 2d 428, 431 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)) (“[A] plaintiff alleging particular wrongs by the church
that are wholly non-religious in character is surely not forbidden his day in court.”).
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relationship absolutely,155 as the Church-Minister Relationship view posits, tort, contract, and other
permissible claims would be similarly constitutionally problematic. By excluding those claims from the
exception, the Court buttresses the view that the purpose of the exception is protecting a church’s
rights to select and control its ministers.
If absolute protection of the church-minister relationship were the purpose of the exception,
several categories of claims brought by non-ministers – claims that do not violate the church autonomy
doctrine156 – would likely, and problematically, fall within the exception. The First Amendment does
not categorically bar tort suits against the negligent religious employers of ministers who sexually abuse
minors.157 A civil court’s inquiry into sexual abuse may implicate the relationship between the abusive
minister and the church.158 If the ministerial exception aims to protect that relationship above all else,
such suits would fall into the exception. Even among scholars who support a strong ministerial
exception that encompasses hostile work environment claims, few suggest that clergy sex abuse of
minors would fall into the exception.159 Child sex abuse cases do not fall into the ministerial exception
because they do not implicate a church’s selection and control of ministers: The purpose of the
exception is the Selection and Control view, not the Church-Minister Relationship view.
Proponents of the Church-Minister Relationship view argue that Title VII claims, whether
adverse employment actions or the creation of hostile work environments, are importantly distinct
from common law torts.160 The relevant distinction is that torts apply to everyone, while Title VII
claims can only arise in the context of an employment relationship.161 This argument assumes a premise
that it claims to refute. The argument goes as follows: Title VII claims are only available to ministerial
employees because of their employment and are therefore not analogous to common law torts.
Common law torts remain available to ministerial employees because they do not depend on the fact
155 See Thomas C. Berg, Ministers, Minimum Wages, and Church Autonomy, 9 ENGAGE 135, 135 (2008) (explaining that
when the ministerial exception applies, it is “absolute”); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 3, at 1284 (“Within its boundaries concerning
which employees are covered and the kinds of claims that are encompassed, the ministerial exception is fortress-like.”).
156 See Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 351 n.2 (Fla. 2002) (collecting cases that illustrate this point). See generally
Christopher J. Merken, Recognizing Hosanna-Tabor’s Limited Scope and Inapplicability to Clergy Sex Abuse Litigation, 2020 ARK. L. NOTES
60 (2020) (discussing several cases in which courts held that litigation over clergy sex abuse, including suits against churches for
negligent hiring, do not violate church autonomy).
157 See, e.g., Doe v. Corp. of Cath. Bishop of Yakima, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1232 (E.D. Wash. 2013); Smith v. O’Connell,
986 F. Supp. 73 (D.R.I. 1997). See also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 281; Corbin, supra note 149, at 2015–16.
158 See Eikenberry, supra note 107, at 290.
159 See Marci A. Hamilton, The Waterloo for the So-Called Church Autonomy Theory: Widespread Clergy Abuse and Institutional
Cover-Up, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 225, 238 (2007) (citing Douglas Laycock, Towards A General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case
of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1406 (1981)) (“[Laycock] admits two exceptions
to autonomy when the issue is internal, to cases involving young children or bodily harm.”); John H. Mansfield, A Tale of Two
Organists: Suits Against Churches for Employment Discrimination and Sexual Abuse by Ministers, 7 GEO. J.L.& PUB. POL’Y 237, 248 (2009).
But seeMark E. Chopko, Stating Claims Against Religious Institutions, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1089, 1115–17 (2003).
160 See, e.g., Brief for Robert F. Cochran, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting the Petition for Reh’g En Banc, at 4,
Demkovich v. St. Andrew’s the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 973 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-2142); Mansfield, supra note
159, at 248.
161 Appellant’s Reply Brief at 13, Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 973 F.3d 718 (7th Cir.
2020) (No. 19-2142) (“[E]mployment discrimination claims involving a minister can only arise by virtue of the ministerial
relationship, which, by nature, can only involve ecclesiastical matters.”). The distinction between hostile work environment claims
and tort claims will be discussed infra Part III, Section B(3).
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of being a ministerial employee. Articulated a different way, this argument says that Title VII claims are
available to ministers only because they were selected as a minister, and, therefore, Title VII claims fall
within the ministerial exception. Common law torts remain available to ministers because they do not
turn on whether an individual was selected as a minister or not. The argument, which purports to
support the Church-Minister Relationship view, assumes that it is the selection of ministers that is
protected, thus differentiating Title VII and common law torts. Protecting church selection,
supervision, and control of employees is the purpose of the ministerial exception.
1. Selection and Control
If the Selection and Control or Selection and Supervision view is right, hostile work
environments fall outside the purpose of the ministerial exception. The actions underlying hostile work
environment claims are, by definition, not essential to the selection, supervision, or control of
ministerial employees.162 The Supreme Court held that the creation of a hostile work environment often
stems from the harassing supervisor or co-worker’s “personal motives, motives unrelated and even
antithetical to the objectives of the employer.”163 As such, “sexual harassment . . . is not conduct within
the scope of employment.”164
Compare a claim for a tangible employment action with one for a hostile work environment.
In the case of tangible employment actions – say being fired or passed up for a promotion – the Court
considers the adverse action an “official act of the enterprise.”165 A supervisor can take a tangible
employment action only because the employer has empowered them with the requisite authority. In
contrast, a hostile work environment is “neither within the scope of [the harasser’s] employment, nor
part of his apparent authority.”166 The creation of hostile work environments, by definition, are not
treated as the official act of the employer.167 How can a harassing employee’s actions taken outside the
scope of his employment implicate his employer’s selection, supervision, or control of other employees?
How can harassment that is, by definition, not the act of the employer, be protected as the act of the
employer? The ministerial exception protects a religious employer’s constitutional right to select,
supervise and control their ministerial employees. A rogue employee’s harassment of another does not
implicate an employer’s right to select, supervise, or control its ministers.
Since harassment falls outside the scope of employment, employers may only be liable under
agency principles,168 and under particular circumstances. Employers are only subject to liability for
162 Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 973 F.3d 718, 727–28 (7th Cir. 2020), reh’g en banc granted,
opinion vacated (Dec. 9, 2020) (first citing Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756–57 (1998); then citing Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 793–94 (1998)) (holding that hostile work environment claims use different standards to determine
employer liability “precisely because the behavior that creates the hostile environment is not essential for management supervision
and control of employees”); see also id. at 728–29 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)) (“Harris teaches that
a hostile work environment simply is not a permissible means of exerting (constitutionally protected) ‘control’ over employees
and accomplishing the mission of the business or religious organization.”).
163 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 762.
166 Id. at 769 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
167 Id. at 762.
168 Id. at 744.
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hostile work environments created by co-workers when the employer is negligent,169 and subject to
liability for hostile work environments created by supervisors when the employer fails to take
reasonable care.170 Liability for hostile work environments, at most, implicates a religious employer’s
non-decision – its negligence and failure to take reasonable care. A religious employer’s non-decision
does not implicate their protected right to select and control their ministerial employees.171 The
ministerial exception’s purpose is the protection of a religious employer’s decisions in selecting,
supervising, and controlling its ministerial employees. That underlying purpose is entirely absent in the
case of hostile work environments.
It is crucial to note the limitations of this argument. The creation of a hostile work
environment is generally outside the scope of employment because, generally, employers do not have
policies promoting or ratifying employee harassment. Of the cases surveyed where a court considered
the harassment of a ministerial employee, the religious employer never claimed the harassment as part
of their employment policies. In the unlikely circumstance in which an employer has a policy in favor
of harassment, such harassment remains, nonetheless, “not essential for management supervision and
control of employees.”172 A hostile work environment is simply “not a permissible means of exerting
(constitutionally protected) ‘control’ over employees and accomplishing the mission of the business or
religious organization.”173 Moreover, while tangible employment actions depend necessarily on a
supervisor’s actual or apparent authority, hostile work environments may still be created by both
supervisors and co-workers; hostile work environments are not essential for selection or control.
2. Church-Minister Relationship
As articulated above, the Church-Minister Relationship view broadens the ministerial
exception beyond its true purpose. If anything that implicates the church-minister relationship is
beyond the purview of civil courts, a wide ranging list of tortious – and criminal – conduct would
seemingly be beyond the purview of civil courts.174 Though few scholars support this extreme result,175
169 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013).
170 Id.
171 Doe v. Roman Cath. Bishop of Orange, No. 17-01424, 2018 WL 6118442, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2018) (quoting
Bollard v. Cal. Providence of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 1999)) (“[T]his case is not about a church’s choice
of representative, refusal to ordain, or adverse personnel action. The only relevant decision attributable to the Diocese of Orange
is its failure to intervene, stop, and prevent Father Kim’s sexual misconduct against another victim. ‘[I]t strays too far from the
rationale of the Free Exercise Clause to extend constitutional protection to this sort of disciplinary inaction simply because a
minister is the target as well as the agent of the harassing activity.’”) (citations omitted).
172 Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 973 F.3d 718, 727–28 (7th Cir. 2020), reh’g en banc granted,
opinion vacated (Dec. 9, 2020) (first citing Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756–57 (1998); then citing Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 793–94 (1998)). The implications of a religious employer claiming religious motivations for harassment
on Free Exercise and Establishment Clause rights are discussed infra, Part III, Section B.
173 Demkovich, 973 F.3d at 728–29 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
174 See, e.g., Eikenberry, supra note 107, at 289–91 (“Allowing sexual-abuse claims while precluding sexual-harassment
claims based on the ministerial exception would lead to an absurd result.”) (citations omitted).
175 See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 159, at 238 (citing Douglas Laycock, Towards A General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The
Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1406 (1981)); Merken, supra note 156, at
73. But see Chopko, supra note 159, at 1115–17.
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some nonetheless posit that the purpose of the exception is to protect the church-minister relationship
from state interference.176 This section will assume arguendo that the Church-Minister Relationship view
is right. Even if the Church-Minister Relationship view is accurate, hostile work environments
nonetheless fall outside the purpose of the ministerial exception.
The Church-Minister Relationship view understands the ministerial exception as necessarily
protecting that which is at the core of religious life.177 The church-minister relationship is at the core,
or “epicenter;”178 it is the church’s “lifeblood.”179 The subsequent argument, in its simplest form, is that
a minister’s hostile work environment claim would impose impermissible intrusion into the lifeblood
of the religious organization. As a result, such claims must be categorically barred.
To determine whether hostile work environment claims by ministerial employees categorically
implicate the protected church-minister relationship, consider a few examples.180 Example 1: A teacher
at a religious high school teaches English but uses a religious curriculum, incorporates religious values
into the classroom, and leads her first period class in daily prayer. She is subjected to harassment by a
group of 12th grade students: On a nearly daily basis, the students make sexual comments to her in the
hallway and corner her in her classroom during off-periods, asking her about her sexual experience and
talking about their own. On at least one occasion, one of the students grabs her butt. The teacher
reports this behavior to the school principal, her supervisor, but no action is taken. The students’
behavior continues.181 Example 2: A Black social worker at a religious hospital is responsible for
developing home plans and hospital long-term stay plans with patients. The planning includes finding
ways to fulfill the patients’ physical, mental, and spiritual needs, including connecting them to faith
leaders and leading them in prayer. A long-term patient repeatedly calls the social worker the “n-word”
and other racial epithets. The social worker complains to her supervisor, who takes no action. The use
of racial epithets continues. Example 3: A religious youth group director regularly leads youth programs
and overnights as part of his job responsibilities. All such programs incorporate recreation with religious
education. At the overnights, another employee regularly corners the director, propositions him for sex,
and demands that they watch pornography together. On one occasion, the other employee exposes
176 See generally Laycock, supra note 3 (arguing both that child sex abuse is not beyond the purview of civil courts, and
that the ministerial exception’s purpose is to protect the church-minister relationship). See also Demkovich v. St. Andrew the
Apostle Par., Calumet City, 3 F.4th 968, 982 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct.
2049, 2060 (2020)) (noting that “religious organizations do not enjoy a general immunity from secular laws,” and that the
ministerial exception does not necessarily protect a church from criminal or tort liability, but nonetheless positing that the purpose
of the ministerial exception is to protect the ministerial relationship from state interference).
177 See, e.g., Demkovich, 3 F.4th 968 at 980; Laycock, supra note 3, at 1376.
178 Bagni, supra note 3, at 1539.
179 McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972) (“The relationship between an organized church and
its ministers is its lifeblood.”). See also Demkovich, 3 F.4th at 979.
180 All three examples assume, without comment, that the religious defendant does not defend the harasser’s behavior
as religiously motivated or part of the defendant’s religious practice. If the religious defendant defends harassment on religious
grounds, the defendant must bear the burden of persuasion and the case can nonetheless be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.
This is discussed infra, Part III, Section B, C.
181 Examples do not stem from any particular real-life cases. Example 1, however, takes inspiration from Bohnert v.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (N.D. Cal. 2015). In Bohnert, the teacher in question was
not a ministerial employee. Bohnert was decided prior to the Supreme Court’s specification of who is a ministerial employee in
Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020). The hypothetical teacher in Example 1 would likely be a
minister under the Morrissey-Berru standard.
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their genitals to the youth group director. The director complained to his supervisor, who takes no
action. The conduct continues.182
All three individuals in these examples are likely ministers.183 Determination of whether
someone is a minister depends on “what an employee does.”184 All three hypothetical employees serve
as a “messenger or teacher” of their religious employer’s faith;185 what they do falls into the category of
ministerial employees. Moreover, all three likely have actionable hostile work environment claims.186 If
hostile work environment claims by ministerial employees are categorically barred, courthouse doors
would slam shut on all three individuals.
The question remains: Would the above allegations implicate the church-minister
relationship? Hostile work environment claims can stem from the actions of students,187 as in Example
1, or even the actions of third-party outsiders,188 as in Example 2. How does a claim alleging student
or third-party harassment implicate the church-minister relationship? Hostile work environment claims
cover a wide array of unlawful conduct by a wide array of actors. It is unavoidably true that some
ministerial hostile environment claims implicate the church-minister relationship. It is also undoubtedly
true that some claims, like these, fall outside that lifeblood of the religious organization.
The question at hand is whether hostile work environment claims by ministerial employees
182 Example 3 takes inspiration from Oral Argument at 2:55, Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City
(No. 19-2142), http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/oralArguments/oar.jsp?caseyear=19&casenumber=2142&listCase=List+case
%28s%29 [https://perma.cc/LT2K-V533].
183 See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2072, 2076, 2082 (2020) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (holding that “the Court . . . collapses Hosanna-Tabor’s careful analysis into a single consideration: whether a church
thinks its employees play an important religious role,” and that the “apparent deference here threatens to make nearly anyone
whom the schools might hire ‘ministers’ unprotected from discrimination in the hiring process”); id. at 2082 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (holding that the Court’s decision implicates “over a hundred thousand secular teachers whose rights are at risk . . .
And that says nothing of the rights of countless coaches, camp counselors, nurses, social-service workers, inhouse lawyers, media-
relations personnel, and many others who work for religious institutions. All these employees could be subject to discrimination
for reasons completely irrelevant to their employers’ religious tenets.”).
184 Id. at 2064.
185 Id.
186 See Legg v. Ulster Cnty., 979 F.3d 101, 117 (2d Cir. 2020) (“We have repeatedly held that the presence of
pornography in a workplace can constitute a hostile work environment.”); Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 577 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (holding that a single use of the “n-word” constitutes severe harassment); Redd v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d
166, 175–76 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that repeated sexual comments and propositions over a long period may constitute actionable
severe or pervasive harassment).
187 Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on this, several lower courts have. See, e.g., Mongelli v. Red Clay
Consolidated Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ., 491 F. Supp. 2d 467, 478 (D. Del. 2007) (“[L]iability for hostile work environment claims
under Title VII may attach to schools that fail to address teachers’ claims of harassment by students.”); Plaza-Torres v. Rey, 376
F. Supp. 2d 171, 182 (D.P.R. 2005) (“Plaintiff may seek redress under Title VII . . . for the sexual harassment suffered on account
of one of her students.”). See also Schroeder v. Hamilton Sch. Dist., 282 F.3d 946, 955–56 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that a district
may be liable for student-on-teacher harassment in violation of § 1983).
188 See, e.g., Dunn v. Wash. Cnty. Hosp., 429 F.3d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that an employer can be liable for a
hostile work environment caused by the acts of non-employees, including customers); Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enters., 107
F.3d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[A]n employer may be held liable for sexual harassment on the part of a private individual, such
as [a customer], where the employer either ratifies or acquiesces in the harassment by not taking immediate and/or corrective
actions when it knew or should have known of the conduct.”).
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
25 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 (2021)
36
must be categorically barred by the ministerial exception. If some such claims do not implicate the
church-minister relationship, the ministerial exception cannot bar them.189 That hostile work
environment claims by ministerial employees can stem from third party conduct, for instance,
demonstrates the crux of hostile work environment claims: they are about severe or pervasive
harassment, not church-minister relationships. Unlike claims alleging tangible, adverse employment
actions that necessarily stem from the authority of the employer, hostile work environments can exist
outside that church-minister relationship. That they exist outside that relationship demonstrates that
they do not categorically implicate the protected relationship.
Given the short facts in Example 3, it is unclear whether the harassing employee is a co-
worker or a supervisor, and whether they too are a ministerial employee. If the harassing employee is a
non-minister, the above argument and analysis applies. Immunizing a religious employer from liability
for its non-ministerial employees’ harassment just because their target was a ministerial employee would
be more akin to blanket tort immunity and far beyond protection of the church-minister relationship.
Where both the harasser and the individual being harassed are ministerial employees, it is admittedly,
trickier. Proponents for a strong ministerial exception that encompasses hostile work environment
claims have argued that because such claims “can only arise by virtue of the ministerial relationship, [the
claims], by nature, can only involve ecclesiastical matters.”190 These proponents of the Church-Minister
view further argue that the ministerial exception “is designed to keep the courts out of the church-
minister relationship, to prevent courts from deciding explicitly religious questions, and to protect
religious organizations from government interference in internal ecclesiastical governance.”191 The
Seventh Circuit adopted this understanding when it barred minister-on-minister hostile work
environment claims because such claims are necessarily “not just a legal question but a religious one,
too.”192
Although minister-on-minister harassment cases may sometimes pose religious questions,193
this is not categorically true. It is challenging to see how the employee’s conduct in Example 3 –
unwelcome sexual propositions, pornography, and nudity – implicate any of these enumerated
protected interests. That both parties are ministers does not, alone, necessitate that religious questions
or internal ecclesiastical governance is at play. While the church-minister relationship is at the core of
ecclesiastical matters, legal consequences for this tortious conduct fails to implicate an ecclesiastical
choice.194 The frequent retort to this argument is that it is the judicial intervention itself – the affirmative
defense, demand for reasonable care, etc. – that consequently interferes with the church-minister
189 See Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he scope of the ministerial
exception to Title VII is limited to what is necessary to comply with the First Amendment.”).
190 Appellant’s Reply Brief at 13, Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 973 F.3d 718 (7th Cir.
2020) (No. 19-2142).
191 Id. at 15 (citing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 194–95 (2012)).
192 Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 3 F.4th 968, 979 (7th Cir. 2021).
193 What this case-by-case analysis looks like is discussed infra, Part III, Section C.
194 If a religious employer argues that an ecclesiastical choice did, in fact, motivate the tortious conduct, the employer
must bear the burden of persuasion (see Jessica R. Vartanian, Note, Confessions of the Church: Discriminatory Practices By Religious
Employers and Justifications for a More Narrow Ministerial Exception, 40 U.TOL.L.REV. 1049, 1056–57 (2009)), and First Amendment
concerns must be explicitly stated, and the harassment itself – both the substance and the manner of criticism – justified and
embraced.
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relationship.195 This concern is overstated. Courts regularly, and without First Amendment issue,
impose on religious organizations requirements for reasonable care.196 The distinction between an
imposition of reasonable care under Title VII as opposed to a common law tort – and whether that
distinction has constitutional implications – is discussed in depth below.
B. Court analysis of ministerial employees’ hostile work environment claims does not categorically violate the First
Amendment.
The legislative history of Title VII documents significant congressional debate regarding
whether the Act’s anti-discrimination provisions should apply to religious employers.197 Congress
ultimately landed on a built-in statutory exception for religious employers when it comes to religious
discrimination. The statutory exception precludes claims of religious discrimination in employment
against religious organizations.198 In other words, a synagogue can discriminate on the basis of religion
when hiring its rabbi. Sensible enough. Title VII does not bar claims of discrimination based on other
protected categories.199 However, under the Act, if that same synagogue wanted to discriminate on the
basis of race when hiring its rabbi, it would not be protected.200 That Title VII applies anti-
discrimination policy to religious employers is crucial to understanding and contextualizing the
ministerial exception. The exception stems not from the statute, but from constitutional necessity. As
such, the scope of the ministerial exception is “limited to what is necessary to comply with the First
Amendment.”201
195 See, e.g., Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (Trott, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen the
Church tenders its ‘reasonable care defense,’ every step the Church took to respond and react to Elvig’s claims will be reviewed by
the district court to determine whether it was reasonable. Such an inquiry into whether the Church exercised ‘reasonable care’
will involve, by necessity, penetrating discovery andmicroscopic examination by litigation of the Church’s disciplinary procedures
and subsequent responsive decisions.”).
196 See, e.g., Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 365 (Fla. 2002) (recognizing the importance of the First Amendment but
holding that it does not protect a religious institution from liability for third party tort claims of sexual assault and battery). See
alsoDemkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 3 F.4th 968, 988 (7th Cir. 2021) (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (“Courts
already navigate these waters with more attention to nuance and less reliance on absolute immunities. Religious liberty still
thrives.”).
197 H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1963), reprinted in EEOC, LEGISLATIVEHISTORYOFTITLESVII ANDXIOFCIVILRIGHTS
ACT OF 1964, at 2010 (1968); Congressional Debate on Titles VII and XI, in 1964 LEGIS. HIST. at 3001, 3004, 3050.
198 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (Title VII does not apply to “a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or
society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion . . . connected with the carrying on . . . of its
activities.”). Levinson, supra note 12, at 93 (“The resulting amended version of Title VII, which was primarily intended to permit
religious employers to employ individuals of a particular faith to carry out its ‘religious activities,’ passed both the House and the
Senate. Eight years later, the 1972 amendments to Title VII deleted the word ‘religious’ and clarified that it would not be an
unlawful employment practice for religious entities, like schools and universities, to hire employees based on their religious beliefs
for all their activities. The statutory text of Title VII thus allows religious employers to be sued for all types of discrimination,
except religious discrimination.”) (footnotes omitted).
199 See, e.g., Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166 (4th Cir. 1985) (“Title VII
does not confer upon religious organizations a license to make . . . decisions on the basis of race, sex, or national origin.”).
200 This is, of course, not true thanks to the judicially created ministerial exception, as discussed throughout.
201 Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir, 1999). See also Demkovich v. St. Andrew
the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 3 F.4th 968, 989 (7th Cir. 2021) (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (“[I]f a special difficulty arises under
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The ministerial exception must except hostile work environment claims by ministerial
employees only if it is constitutionally necessary. Proponents of broadening the exception argue that
allowing such claims would violate both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First
Amendment. The major constitutional concerns typically stem from 1) investigation and judicial inquiry
itself,202 and 2) the burdens of the affirmative defense.203
This section will argue that court analysis of a hostile work environment claim by a ministerial
employee against their religious employer does not categorically violate the First Amendment. It is
crucial to note that in the vast majority of cases surveyed, religious defendants did not defend harassing
behavior on religious grounds.204 Religious organizations have typically condemned such behavior, not
sanctioned it. In such cases, the full argument discussed in this article applies. If a religious organization
does defend harassment on religious grounds, it shall bear the burden of persuasion,205 its First
Amendment concerns must be explicitly stated, and the harassment itself – both the substance and
manner – embraced.206 In such a case, a secular court’s inquiry will be limited. A court can ask whether
such grounds are sincere but cannot probe into the veracity of religious claims.207
There is value in requiring a religious organization to claim and explicitly endorse harassment
to receive this limited inquiry; there is value in information-forcing.208Moreover, religious justifications
the First Amendment, courts will deal with it”); cf. Marsha V. Freeman,What’s Religion Got to Do with it? Virtually Nothing: Hosanna-
Tabor and the Unbridled Power of the Ministerial Exemption, 16 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 133, 135 (2013) (“The courts have allowed
what was created as a seemingly narrow exception geared to protecting an institution’s religious freedom to be broadened
considerably.”).
202 See, e.g., Cath. Bishop of Chi. v. N.L.R.B., 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979) (“It is not only the conclusions that may be
reached by the Board which may impinge on rights guaranteed by the Religion Clauses, but also the very process of inquiry
leading to findings and conclusions.”); Jaziri, supra note 54, at 730 (“The fear is that church personnel and religious documents
would become subject to a variety of legal processes—including subpoena, discovery, and cross-examination—that would
effectively probe the church’s mind regarding the selection of its ministers.”).
203 See, e.g., Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (Trott, J., dissenting) (“Thus, when
the Church tenders its ‘reasonable care defense,’ every step the Church took to respond and react to Elvig’s claims will be
reviewed by the district court to determine whether it was reasonable. Such an inquiry into whether the Church exercised
‘reasonable care’ will involve, by necessity, penetrating discovery and microscopic examination by litigation of the Church’s
disciplinary procedures and subsequent responsive decisions . . . Such a searching analysis will now be applied to the internal
workings of the Church.”).
204 See, e.g., id. at 959 (quoting Bollard, 196 F.3d at 947) (“As in Bollard, however, the Defendants here ‘do not offer a
religious justification for the harassment [Elvig] alleges,’ and, indeed, deny it occurred at all.”) (citations omitted). But see
Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., 343 F. Supp. 3d 772, 786–87 (N.D. Ill. 2018), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom.
Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 973 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2020), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Dec.
9, 2020) (noting that harassment on the basis of sexual orientation may have been religiously motivated). Whether the religious
defendant in Demkovich asserted a religious justification is debatable. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee Sandor Demkovich at 33 (No.
19-2142) (“The Archdiocese has not contended that offensive and demeaning insults are part of its religious practices, or that it
condones the conduct Demkovich alleges.”).
205 See Jessica R. Vartanian, Note, Confessions of the Church: Discriminatory Practices By Religious Employers and Justifications for a More
Narrow Ministerial Exception, 40 U.TOL.L.REV. 1049, 1056–57 (2009),
206 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 293.
207 See generallyUnited States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (holding that inquiry into whether a religious belief is sincerely
held is permissible).
208 See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 293 (“Because the claim that religious teaching supports the hostile environment
would be a defense to otherwise actionable harassment, the employer should have to assert that the employee had violated the
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do not necessitate that all actions are constitutionally protected.209 As Caroline Mala Corbin wrote:
[I]f a religious organization states that according to its tenets, married men are the
head of household and therefore are paid more than married women, it has conceded
discrimination. The court can find that it violated Title VII while deferring
completely to the religious organization on doctrinal questions.210
What the line is – between protected vs. unprotected religiously motivated activity – is beyond
the scope of this article. Although the line is ambiguous, there is a strong argument that severe or
pervasive harassment should be beyond the pale.211
The question remains: What about the majority of cases, in which the defendant does not
explicitly claim religious reasons for the harassment? This section will focus primarily on those cases.
That the rare religiously motivated harassment poses unique First Amendment questions does not
undermine, but in fact supports, the proposition that ministerial employees’ hostile work environment
claims must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. This section will focus on investigation and judicial
inquiry as well as the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense, arguing that neither violate the Free Exercise
nor Establishment Clauses. From there, this section will make an affirmative argument that, because
hostile work environment claims are essentially tortious, and tort claims by ministerial employees do
community’s religious principles. The employer similarly should have to assert that the supervisor’s mode of expression of those
principles was in keeping with the faith. These requirements of accountability would validate the First Amendment defense
without involving the court in a forbidden adjudication of the faith’s norms, or its means of communicating those norms.”).
Religious organizations may balk at the requirement to explicitly endorse harassment. Requiring such an admission to receive
this limited inquiry therefore serves a notice function to employees and potential employees, and may actually decrease the
number of employers claiming this defense.
209 See, e.g., Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S.Ct. 2049, 2072 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(“Consistent with the First Amendment (and over sincerely held religious objections), the Government may compel religious
institutions to pay Social Security taxes for their employees, deny nonprofit status to entities that discriminate because of race,
require applicants for certain public benefits to register with Social Security numbers, enforce child-labor protections, and impose
minimum-wage laws.”) (citations omitted).
210 Corbin, supra note 149, at 2014. Corbin continues: “One might argue, however, that by preventing the church from
realizing its doctrinal requirements . . . the state will subtly force the church to conform its religious doctrine to the state’s values.
But under this reasoning, the state could never declare a religious practice illegal, and that is clearly not the case after Smith. In
allowing Title VII claims against religious organizations, the court is not declaring that antidiscrimination represents an
organization’s true beliefs. It is merely declaring that antidiscrimination is the secular law and must be complied with.”) (footnotes
omitted). Id. Though Corbin is discussing all Title VII claims, the reasoning clearly applies to the more specific hostile work
environment context.
211 See Morrissey-Berru, 140 S.Ct. at 2072 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The irremediable harm caused by severe or pervasive
harassment has been studied in depth and is a strong point in this argument. See, e.g., Jose A. Bauermeister, et al., Sexuality-Related
Work Discrimination and Its Association with the Health of Sexual Minority Emerging and Young Adult Men in the Detroit Metro Area, 11 SEX
RES. SOC. POLICY 1 (2014) (discussing the harms of discrimination, including harassment, on the basis of sexuality); Jason N.
Houle, et al., The Impact of Sexual Harassment on Depressive Symptoms During the Early Occupational Career, 1 SOC. MENT. HEALTH 89
(2011) (addressing the harms to mental health caused by sexual harassment); Heather McLaughlin, et al., The Economic and Career
Effects of Sexual Harassment on Working Women, 3 GENDER SOC. 333 (2017) (addressing the economic harms caused by sexual
harassment); Christianna Silva, Almost Every Transgender Employee Experiences Harassment or Mistreatment on the Job, Study Shows,
Newsweek (November 29, 2017, 6:44 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/transgender-employees-experience-harassment-job-
726494 (discussing the frequency of harassment and excessive harm faced by transgender workers).
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not categorically violate the First Amendment, hostile work environment claims by ministerial
employees similarly do not categorically violate the First Amendment.
1. Free Exercise Clause
The ministerial exception is grounded in both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses
of the First Amendment.212 Although it has roots in both clauses, or perhaps because of that, courts
often conflate or fail to specify which clause they are relying on when making ministerial exception
determinations.213One study found that “the courts never split their decisions on the First Amendment
Religion Clauses. All high-entanglement-risk cases were also judged to pose a high threat to free
exercise, and vice versa.”214 Despite the widespread conflation of the two clauses, this section will look
at each clause in turn.
The Free Exercise Clause protects a religious organization’s right to “decide for themselves,
free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”215
Proponents of a broad ministerial exception have argued that hostile work environment claims violate
the Free Exercise Clause by, among other things, 1) interfering with internal church governance and
discipline216 and 2) altering a church’s incentives in hiring ministers by requiring an eye towards
litigiousness.217 Consider first the argument that hostile work environment claims necessarily interfere
with internal church governance and discipline, therefore violating the Free Exercise Clause. Ira C.
Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle posed the question well when they asked: “Is it possible for courts to
evaluate the reasonableness of mechanisms for prevention and correction of harassment without
intruding on the internal governance of a religious institution?”218 This question is crucial, but the
concern is overstated.
Hostile work environment claims pose limited inquiry: Did harassment happen, was it severe
or pervasive, and did the employer take reasonable care to prevent or correct it? This narrow inquiry
212 See Angela C. Carmella, Catholic Institutions in Court: The Religion Clauses and Political-Legal Compromise, 120 W. VA. L.
REV. 1, 34 (2017) (citing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012)) (“[The Court]
held that the ministerial exemption, as an affirmative defense to discrimination claims, is constitutionally compelled by both the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.”).
213 See Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of N.C. Conf. of United Methodist Church, 63 F. Supp. 2d 694, 705 n.9 (E.D.N.C. 1999)
(explaining the “similarity of the discrete inquiries” at play when analyzing the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. “While
the McClure court based its decision on an analysis of the free exercise clause, some of the courts following McClure have based
their decisions on a combination of free exercise and establishment clause principles”).
214 Belcove-Shalin, supra note 16, at 126–27.
215 Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
216 See, e.g., Chopko, supra note 159, at 1117 (quoting N.L.R.B v. Cath. Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979)), aff’d,
440 U.S. 490, 99 S. Ct. 1313, 59 L. Ed. 2d 533 (1979)) (“[I]f the plaintiff’s claims depend on a court reviewing internal policies
and protocols, scrutinizing a religious chain of discipline, and assessing culpability because the religious entity emphasized
reconciliation and not punishment, the ‘very process of inquiry’ may lead to an unconstitutional exercise.”).
217 See, e.g., EEOC v. Cath. Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“[W]e think it fair to say that the prospect
of future investigations and litigation would inevitably affect to some degree the criteria by which future vacancies in the
ecclesiastical faculties would be filled.”); Minker v. Balt. Ann. Conf. of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1360 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (“The Church asserts that simply permitting a court to hear Minker’s contract claims might distort church appointment
decisions —causing churches to make only those choices that avoid the appearance of legal impropriety.”).
218 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 277.
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looks at discrete questions, failing to encroach on a church’s core internal governance. That limited
inquiry, “combined with the ability of the district court to control discovery,” can protect a church’s
internal governance and disciplinary procedures.219 Moreover, the reasonableness inquiry, referenced
by Lupu and Tuttle above, asks only whether the employer’s actions could stop unlawful harassment,
not what their motivations were or whether they did so using religious or secular tenants.220 This inquiry
is no more intrusive of internal governance than the permissible question of: Who is a minister?221
The second argument, that hostile work environment claims will alter a church’s
decisionmaking in hiring ministers, is similarly without merit. Churches are not generally immune from
civil suits; non-ministerial Title VII claims, breaches of contract, torts, and other common law and
statutory claims may arise at any time.222 These claims may stem from a wide array of actors and may
pose significant liability for a religious organization. If a church is going to consider litigation costs
when making employment decisions, one additional source of liability is not the determinative factor.223
Even looking only at ministers, “if a ministerial position includes driving the church van, a church may
forgo hiring the more spiritual applicant for one who has never been in an auto accident to avoid tort
liability.”224 Tort liability from bad driving, however, poses no Free Exercise problem. Hostile work
environment claims by ministerial employees will not alter a church’s decisionmaking in hiring ministers
any more than the myriad of other liabilities for which churches are already susceptible. Such
considerations, accordingly, pose no Free Exercise problem.
Connected to this argument is the concern that liability for hostile work environments
encourages employers to implement anti-harassment training and policies.225 Such government
encouraged policies and training, the concern elaborates, violate a church’s Free Exercise rights.226 This
concern is ameliorated by the same argument as above: Because religious organizations may face liability
for non-ministerial hostile work environment claims, these incentives to create anti-harassment training
and prevention already exist. Allowing ministerial hostile work environment claims impose no new
incentives on religious organizations. Moreover, how an organization runs such prevention or
219 Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 950 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian
Church, 375 F.3d 951, 967–68 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 advisory committee’s notes) (“In 2000, the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure were amended ‘to involve the court more actively in regulating the breadth of sweeping or contentious
discovery.’ In particular, the new rules limit the breadth of discovery that can occur absent court approval. Under Rule 26(b)(1),
for example, discovery must now relate more directly to a ‘claim or defense’ than it did previously, and ‘if there is an objection
that discovery goes beyond material relevant to the parties’ claims or defenses, the court would become involved.’”).
220 See Elvig supra note 219, at 963.
221 See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S.Ct. 2049, 2066–2067 (2020) (determining who is a
minister without any First Amendment problem).
222 See generally Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Courts, Clergy, and Congregations: Disputes Between Religious Institutions and
Their Leaders, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119 (2009) (documenting various types of civil suits against religious organizations).
223 Chopko, supra note 159, at 1089–90 (“The demise of charitable immunity generally, and its limitation in virtually
every jurisdiction, means that these entities must pay attention to their legal relationships and conduct.”).
224 Corbin, supra note 149, at 2009.
225 Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (“Title VII is designed to encourage the creation of
antiharassment policies and effective grievance mechanisms.”); see also Levinson, supra note 12, at 110 (“The purpose of the
affirmative defense is to promote Title VII’s goal of encouraging employers to implement sexual harassment policies.”).
226 Hamilton, supra note 159, at 243 (quoting Mark E. Chopko, Stating Claims Against Religious Institutions, 44 B.C. L.
REV. 1089, 1118 (2003)) (“The imposition of such a secular duty carries a risk of subtly altering the church’s internal structure.”).
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correction mechanisms – whether in a religious or secular manner – is entirely up to them.227
2. Establishment Clause
The Free Exercise Clause has not been the primary concern in the two ministerial exception
Supreme Court cases nor lower court cases addressing hostile work environments in particular.228
Rather, excessive entanglement, impermissible under the Establishment Clause, has animated recent
court decisions. State action is permissible under the Establishment Clause if 1) it has a secular purpose,
2) its primary effects neither advance nor inhibit religion, and 3) it does not excessively entangle
government with religion.229 Title VII has a secular purpose and does not advance nor inhibit religion.
The crucial question is: Do Title VII hostile work environment claims by ministerial employees
excessively entangle government with religion?
The affirmative defense to hostile work environment claims – demanding that employers
exercise reasonable care – arguably entangles judicial inquiry with religion.230 The concern is that inquiry
into a church’s reasonable care will require a court to examine “every step a church took to respond to
a plaintiff’s allegation . . . entangl[ing] [the court] with religious decision-making processes.”231 The
question, put simply, is: Does this inquiry – did the church exercise reasonable care? – excessively entangle
the court with religion?
One judicial inquiry intimately related to this topic is the question of who qualifies as a minister
under the ministerial exception. As the Supreme Court determined inMorrissey-Berru, civil courts identify
ministers based on what a given employee does.232 This totality of the circumstances test bestows to
courts the right to consider several key questions: Does the individual role inculcate or transmit
messages of faith? 233 Do they conduct religious ceremonies, prayers, or rituals? 234 Are there other
“relevant circumstances” that elucidate “whether each particular position implicated the fundamental
227 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 295–96 (“Of course, a religious denomination may express its concern about
harassment of employees, clergy included, in religious terms. With respect to policies and training, we can imagine the deployment
of language about respecting the dignity of the person, in addition to or instead of more conventional phrasing about the physical
and emotional integrity of employees. All that matters for purposes of the defense, however, is that the policy and training be
reasonable steps to prevent the wrong. Preferring secular to religious understandings of the wrong would raise a constitutional
problem of discrimination against religion. Employers, secular or religious, are required to provide good faith and effective
communication, in any terms that supervisors and other employees can reasonably understand.”).
228 See, e.g., Dolquist v. Heartland Presbytery, 342 F.Supp.2d 996 (D. Kan. 2004) (evaluating the Establishment Clause
as the primary concern); Rojas v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Rochester, 557 F.Supp.2d 387 (W.D. N.Y. 2008) (evaluating the
Establishment Clause as the primary concern). See also Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 271 (calling free exercise concerns “barely
relevant” and establishment clause concerns “central”).
229 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
230 See Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (Trott, J., dissenting) (“Such an inquiry
into whether the Church exercised ‘reasonable care’ will involve, by necessity, penetrating discovery andmicroscopic examination
by litigation of the Church’s disciplinary procedures and subsequent responsive decisions.”).
231 Jaziri, supra note 54, at 747.
232 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S.Ct. 2049 (2020).
233 Id. at 2064.
234 Id.
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purpose of the exception?”235 This broad, far reaching inquiry about issues of faith, internal religious
role, and religious structure has the seal of approval from the Supreme Court; “Who is a minister?”
poses no entanglement problem.236
Compare the inquiry about who is a minister to the question of whether reasonable care was
taken. “There is no neutral and secular legal manner to resolve the question of who qualifies as a
minister.”237 Contrary to that, reasonable care relies on secular, neutral principles238 that can be asked
and answered without reference to religious doctrine: Was there an anti-harassment policy? Was it clear
where harassment could be reported? Was there training?239 The question of who is a minister is a more
“theological question” than is the question of reasonable care.240 If “Who is a minister?” does not
involve excessive entanglement between a court and church, how does “did they take reasonable
care?”241
Moreover, courts inquire into this question without excessive entanglement when non-
ministerial employees bring hostile work environment claims against their religious employers. Consider
two hostile work environment claims. Scenario A: A janitor at a religious school alleges that his
supervisor, a minister, repeatedly subjected him to a hostile work environment based on his national
origin. If the janitor brings his claim and the court concludes that the harassment was severe or
pervasive, the court then asks whether the religious school exercised reasonable care to prevent or
correct the harassment. Scenario B: A teacher at a religious school alleges that his supervisor, a minister,
repeatedly subjected him to a hostile work environment based on his national origin. If the teacher
brings his claim and the court concludes that the harassment was severe or pervasive, the court then
asks whether the religious school exercised reasonable care to prevent or correct the harassment. If you
got déjà vu reading the two scenarios, it was warranted. The two scenarios are identical, save that one
plaintiff is a janitor and the other, a teacher. The question – whether the school exercised reasonable
care – is identical. If hostile work environment claims by ministerial employees are barred, Scenario A
would be allowed while Scenario B would not.242With identical questions for the court, it is implausible
235 Id. at 2067.
236 Some judges have questioned the constitutionality of this inquiry. See id. at 2069–70 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I
write separately, however, to reiterate my view that the Religion Clauses require civil courts to defer to religious organizations’
good-faith claims that a certain employee’s position is ‘ministerial.’”). This constitutional concern has not received significantly
more widespread attention, and the question remains permissible.
237 Griffin, supra note 130, at 1006–07.
238 See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) (rejecting mandatory deference to religious organizations and instead holding
that neutral principles of law could permissibly be used to adjudicate a church property dispute).
239 See U.S.EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, Best Practices for Employers and Human Resources/EEO
Professionals, https://www.eeoc.gov/initiatives/e-race/best-practices-employers-and-human-resourceseeo-professionals [https:
//perma.cc/78X3-5S3M].
240 Griffin, supra note 130, at 1006–07. Consider also how in Hosanna-Tabor the court had to evaluate the distinction
between called teachers and lay teachers, a clearly religious question, that posed no Establishment Clause problem. Hosanna-
Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 177 (2012).
241 As one commentator noted, “application of the ministerial exemption can entangle a court in religious doctrine
more than application of Title VII. In determining whether a plaintiff counts as a ‘minister’ who triggers the ministerial
exemption, courts must decide whether the plaintiff plays an important religious role. In so doing, courts are deciding directly
questions of religious doctrine in a way they never do when deciding whether discrimination occurred.” Corbin, supra note 149,
at 2026.
242 Under Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S.Ct. 2049 (2020), the teacher is likely a minister for the
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that the question excessively entangles the court with religion in one scenario, and not the other. Since
the janitor can bring his claim without Establishment Clause problems, so too must the teacher be able
to.
Finally, the bar for excessive entanglement has grown higher in recent years and a court’s
inquiry into reasonable care does not meet that high bar of impermissibility. In Bowen v. Kendrick, the
Supreme Court found no excessive entanglement when the government reviewed grantee religious
organizations’ counseling programs, monitored their materials, and paid periodic visits.243 In Agostini v.
Felton, the Supreme Court held that a program sending public employees into religious schools did not
involve excessive entanglement, despite regular government visits and inquiries to ensure that the public
employees were not teaching religious doctrine.244 According to the Supreme Court, “[i]nteraction
between church and state is inevitable, and we have always tolerated some level of involvement between
the two.”245 Some level of entanglement is permissible, excessive government entanglement is not.246 The
question of whether a church exercised reasonable care will, admittedly, require some interaction
between church and state. This interaction, like that in Agostini or Bowen, does not require excessive
government entanglement with religion and is therefore permissible.
3. Hostile work environment claims are essentially tortious and therefore, court analysis of such
claims does not categorically violate the First Amendment.
Hostile work environment claims, though stemming from Title VII, are essentially tortious.
Just as tort claims by ministerial employees against their religious employers do not necessarily implicate
First Amendment rights, neither do hostile work environment claims. This section will first
demonstrate that tort claims are not categorically barred by the First Amendment and then proceed to
explain how hostile work environment claims are essentially the same or analogous to tort claims.
Finally, this section will connect those two claims to conclude that hostile work environment claims by
ministerial employees are not barred by the First Amendment.
i. Tort claims are not categorically barred by the First Amendment.
Courts have long recognized that religious organizations may be held liable for tortious
conduct.247 Religious organizations are not above the law.248 Churches have been held liable for a wide
purpose of the ministerial exception.
243 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615–17 (1988).
244 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233–34 (1997).
245 Id. at 233.
246 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613–15 (1971).
247 See, e.g., Skrzypczak v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1244-45 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rayburn v.
Gen. Conf. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985)) (“‘Of course churches are not—and should not be—
above the law.’ Churches ‘may be held liable for their torts and upon their valid contracts.’”). See also Levinson, supra note 12, at
112–13; Carmella, supra note 210, at 43 (discussing the history of charitable immunity and its decline with the advent of insurance).
248 See Skrzypczak, 611 F.3d at 1244–45 (quoting Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1171); Guerrier v. S. New Eng. Conf. Ass’n of
Seventh Day Adventists, Inc., No. CV085007824, 2009 WL 4282894, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 12, 2009) (citing Friedlander v.
Port Jewish Ctr., 588 F. Supp. 2d 428, 431 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)) (holding that the ministerial exception “plainly [did] not create for
religious institutions a charmed existence free from liability for their torts and upon their valid contracts.”). See also Malicki v.
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range of tort claims ranging from assault or battery249 to intentional infliction of emotional distress.250
Churches have also been held liable under several theories of tort negligence based on the sexual
misconduct of its clergy.251 While some tort claims have been dismissed on First Amendment
grounds,252 these have been analyzed on a case-by-case basis. Neither the processes that a court need
to partake in, nor the demand for reasonable care have posed categorical constitutional problems for
tort claims against religious organizations.253 Torts generally do not, and certainly do not categorically,
pose a First Amendment issue.254 The First Amendment does not exempt religious organizations from
neutral tort law.
ii. Hostile work environment claims are essentially tortious.
The Supreme Court relied on tort and agency principles in determining the scope of liability
for a hostile work environment claim.255 In Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, the Supreme Court analyzed a
Doe, 814 So.2d 347, 351 (Fla. 2002); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch, v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 196 (2012)
(buttressing this understanding by leaving tort claims out of the scope of the ministerial exception).
249 See Malicki, 814 So.2d at 364; Esbeck, supra note 154, at 76–77 (explaining that ministers’ tort claims are analyzed
on a case-by-case basis and asserting “there can be little question that religious officers and organizations are liable in tort for
assault, battery, false imprisonment, and the like, all claims which involve coercive and often violent activity”).
250 McRaney v. N. Am. Mission Bd. of the S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 966 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2020) (allowing an
Executive Director’s claims for intentional interference with business relationships, defamation, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress to go forward); McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 858 (N.J. 2002). See also Drevlow v. Lutheran Church, Mo.
Synod, 991 F.2d 468, 472 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that the court had jurisdiction over a claim of intentional interference with a
legitimate expectation of employment brought by a minister against a religious organization).
251 See, e.g., Rashedi v. Gen. Bd. of Church of Nazarene, 54 P.3d 349, 350–54 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002); Noll v. Hartford
Roman Cath. Diocesan Corp., No. HHDX04CV024034702S, 2008 WL 4853361 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 2008); Smith v.
O’Connell, 986 F.Supp. 73 (D.R.I.1997).
252 See, e.g., Michael Helfand, Implied Consent to Religious Institutions: A Primer and a Defense, 50 CONN. L. REV. 877, 905–
06 (2018) (explaining how tort claims based on religious shunning have “[f]or the most part,” been dismissed on church autonomy
grounds); Carmella, supra note 212, at 43 (explaining that clergy malpractice torts, though analyzed case-by-case, tend to “involve
a court and jury in evaluating religious doctrine and practice,” and are generally dismissed on church autonomy grounds).
253 See Carmella, supra note 212, at 51–52 (quoting Morrison, 905 So. 2d at 1222) (“[C]ourts have allowed these abuse
cases to proceed to a jury trial, and have allowed juries to make detailed factual findings of how churches handled abuse
complaints because that is the way tort law works. If a church ‘has specific knowledge that children within its care are in danger
of sexual molestation, and if it has the authority, power and ability to protect those children from that known danger of abuse
and molestation, it is for a jury to determine whether it took reasonable steps to protect the children.’”).
254 Eikenberry, supra note 107, at 289 (citing Smith v. O’Connell, 986 F. Supp. 73, 79 (D.R.I. 1997)) (“Plaintiffs alleging
that religious organizations are liable for sexual assault by their clergy members have had to overcome Free Exercise arguments
in order to proceed with their claims. The courts that have allowed such claims to go forward have held that neutral tort law can
be used without violating the Free Exercise Clause and that the Smith case requires that churches not be immune from neutral
laws of general applicability.”).
255 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 758 (1998) (explaining the scope of liability under hostile work
environment claims, the Court stated that the “[s]cope of employment does not define the only basis for employer liability under
agency principles. In limited circumstances, agency principles impose liability on employers even where employees commit torts
outside the scope of employment”). See also Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 796–97 (1998).
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
25 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 (2021)
46
hostile work environment claim as an intentional tort.256 The Court stated: “An employer may be liable
for both negligent and intentional torts committed by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment. Sexual harassment under Title VII presupposes intentional conduct.”257 The Court also
held that the Restatement of Agency “makes an employer vicariously liable for sexual harassment by
an employee who uses apparent authority . . . or who was ‘aided in accomplishing the tort by the
existence of the agency relation.’”258 The Court repeatedly and without fanfare analogized the hostile
work environment claim to a common law tort and analyzed the claim under this tort framework. Even
the dissenting justices in Ellerth who objected to the imposition of employer liability analyzed the hostile
work environment claim under this tort framework.259 There was unanimity that hostile work
environment claims are essentially tortious.
Moreover, the standard for analysis for several tort claims and Title VII hostile work
environment claims is significantly similar.260 In Malicki, the court reasoned that the necessary inquiry
for a tort claim based on a minister’s sexual misconduct was “whether the Church Defendants had
reason to know of the tortious conduct and did nothing to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm.”261
This inquiry did not differ depending on whether it was a child or adult alleging tortious sexual
misconduct.262 Similarly, this inquiry does not differ depending on whether the claim is brought under
common law tort or as a Title VII hostile work environment claim. In both cases, the underlying
question is the same: Did the defendant know of the unlawful conduct and do nothing to prevent or
correct the harm?
In the case of a co-worker harasser, a hostile work environment claim asks whether the
employer was negligent.263 In the case of a supervisor harasser, a hostile work environment claim asks
whether the employer took reasonable care to prevent or correct harassing behavior.264 The negligence
at issue in the case of a co-worker harasser is explicitly tort negligence.265 Tort negligence (in Title VII)
is unambiguously the same as tort negligence (in a tort claim). The reasonable care inquiry is also no
more intrusive and is substantially similar to the tort standard; it “reflects foundational tort law
principles.”266 Beyond congruent analysis, the underlying interests and harms of hostile work
environment claims, things like the protection of “bodies, dignity, and psychic well-being,” map
256 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 744, 756. The Ellerth Court uses the word “tort” 43 times throughout the opinion. Id.
257 Id. at 756.
258 Id. at 744 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d)).
259 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 771–772 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
260 See Levinson, supra note 12, at 113 (“In cases where the harassment is perpetrated by coworkers, victims would have
to demonstrate that the religious employer’s response was negligent, thereby meeting the same negligence standard common to
all tortious conduct.”).
261 Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 364 (Fla. 2002).
262 Id.
263 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424 (2013).
264 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
265 Vance, 570 U.S. at 446 (explaining that the “negligence standard . . . is thought to provide adequate protection for
tort plaintiffs in many other situations. There is no reason why this standard, if accompanied by proper instructions, cannot
provide [adequate protection] in the context at issue here”). See also Levinson, supra note 12, at 113.
266 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 266.
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perfectly onto the concerns typically at issue in tort law.267
iii. Hostile work environment claims are, accordingly, not categorically barred by the First Amendment.
This argument has a basic logical structure: 1) tort claims do not categorically violate the First
Amendment, 2) hostile work environment claims are essentially tort claims and, therefore, 3) hostile
work environment claims do not categorically violate the First Amendment. Judges are capable of First
Amendment-sensitive case-by-case analyses of tort claims against religious employers. Hostile work
environment claims are analogous to torts; therefore, judges can permissibly use case-by-case analysis
to analyze hostile work environment claims. Opponents of this view infrequently oppose point one:
Most scholars concur that tort claims do not categorically violate the First Amendment.268 Opponents
do, however, frequently attack this argument on point two: They argue that hostile work environment
claims and tort claims are importantly different.
In an amici curiae brief in support of the petition for rehearing en banc in Demkovich, amici
argued that the tort analogy is inapplicable because 1) “tort law defines unlawful conduct in objective
terms,” while hostile work environment claims are subjective, and 2) hostile work environment claims
“typically arise out of speech that is alleged to be hostile or offensive” while tort claims arise out of
conduct.269 The first argument falls short when we consider the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress; torts, like hostile environment claims, often require both objective and subjective
factors.270Hostile work environment claims are no more subjective than permissible tort claims. As for
the second argument, torts, just like hostile work environment claims, can arise out of verbal or physical
abuse.271 Torts and hostile work environment claims both arise out of conduct. 272
267 Id. at 286.
268 See, e.g., Skrzypczak v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1244–45 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rayburn
v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985)) (“‘Of course churches are not—and should
not be—above the law.’ Churches ‘may be held liable for their torts and upon their valid contracts.’”); Esbeck, supra note 154, at
76–77 (explaining that minister’s tort claims are analyzed on a case-by-case basis and asserting “there can be little question that
religious officers and organizations are liable in tort for assault, battery, false imprisonment, and the like, all claims which involve
coercive and often violent activity”); Helfand, supra note 252, at 905–06 (explaining how tort claims based on religious shunning
have “[f]or the most part,” been dismissed on church autonomy grounds, but acknowledging that this is not categorically the
case).
269 Brief for Robert F. Cochran, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting the Petition for Reh’g En Banc, at 4–5, Demkovich
v. St. Andrew’s the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 973 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-2142).
270 See, e.g., Anderson v. First Century Fed. Credit Union, 738 N.W.2d 40, 51–52 (S.D. 2007) (explaining that an
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim requires “(1) an act by the defendant amounting to extreme and outrageous
conduct; (2) intent on the part of the defendant to cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress; (3) the defendant’s conduct was
the cause in-fact of plaintiff’s distress; and (4) the plaintiff suffered an extreme disabling emotional response to defendant’s
conduct”).
271 See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 569 n.18 (1987) (“The American Law Institute
urges that as long as the distress [in a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress] is ‘genuine and severe,’ bodily harm
should not be required. Restatement § 46(k). Many jurisdictions have adopted the Restatement’s approach, see, e.g., Poulsen v.
Russell, 300 N.W.2d 289, 291 (Iowa 1981); Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148, 154 (Me.1979).”).
272 See Brief for Robert F. Cochran, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting the Petition for Reh’g En Banc, at 4–5, Demkovich
v. St. Andrew’s the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 973 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-2142) (explaining that the tortious nature
of the claim requires an objective standard).
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An additional argument is that hostile work environment claims are necessarily distinct from
torts because hostile work environment claims only exist thanks to the employment relationship. This,
however, is a distinction without a difference. The argument presumes that in all hostile work
environment claims the “right at issue is the right to employment.”273 Remedies for hostile work
environments, like remedies in tort, run the gamut. Reinstatement, for example, or other substitutes for
reinstatement,274 would necessarily violate the First Amendment. Remedies for hostile work
environment, cabined by what remedies are permissible under tort claims, would pose no similar First
Amendment problem. Remedies for the harm the harassment caused do not implicate the “right to
employment.”
C. Case-by-case analysis is the only constitutionally sound approach forward.
This article does not posit radical change or demand an overhaul of the ministerial exception.
To the contrary, this article recognizes the constitutional grounding of the exception and the normative
and constitutional importance of allowing religious organizations to select ministers without state
interference. This article endorses a modest approach: a case-by-case analysis of hostile work
environment claims by ministerial employees. Some claims may violate a church’s First Amendment
rights and should, accordingly, be barred by the ministerial exception. The proposal herein does not
displace a court’s right to utilize the ministerial exception in harassment cases.275 Rather, this proposal
modestly asks a court to look at the specific facts of the case or controversy and determine whether the
suit can go forward without intruding on a defendant’s First Amendment rights. If a set of facts does
not implicate the church’s First Amendment rights, the case should go forward.
Congress intended Title VII to cover religious employers and ministerial employees.276
Congressional intent and statutory text can, of course, be overturned by the demands of the
Constitution; they cannot, however, be overthrown by mere speculation.277 A categorical exception of
273 Oral Argument at 20:58, Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 973 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2020)
(No. 19-2142), http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/oralArguments/oar.jsp?caseyear=19&casenumber=2142&listCase=List+case
%28s%29 [https://perma.cc/4593-DXP2].
274 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 194 (2012) (“Perich continues to
seek front pay in lieu of reinstatement, backpay, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. An award of such relief
would operate as a penalty on the Church for terminating an unwanted minister, and would be no less prohibited by the First
Amendment than an order overturning the termination. Such relief would depend on a determination that Hosanna–Tabor was
wrong to have relieved Perich of her position, and it is precisely such a ruling that is barred by the ministerial exception.”).
275 See, e.g. Preece v. Covenant Presbyterian Church, No. 8:13CV188, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52751, at *7 (D. Neb.
Apr. 22, 2015) (utilizing a case-by-case analysis and looking at the specific facts of the case, the court held that the First
Amendment required the minister’s harassment claim be dismissed).
276 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-1(a) (2013) (Title VII does not apply to “a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with
respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion,” but does apply with respect to an individual’s race, color, sex,
or national origin).
277 See Vartanian, supra note 194, at 1056–57 (quoting Crowley v. State, 268 N.W.2d 616, 618 (S.D. 1978)) (“[T]here is
a presumption that a congressional statute, such as Title VII, does not violate the First Amendment, for ‘it is not for the courts
to assume in advance that Congress will pass any legislation in violation of the First Amendment.’ . . . Accordingly, when a party
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hostile work environment claims by ministerial employees relies on unsubstantiated speculation that all
such claims will violate the First Amendment. Since religious organizations have no blanket immunity
from litigation, however, whether the First Amendment demands immunity in a given case must
depend on the “potential in each case for interference with the selection of clergy or conflict with
religious teaching.”278 First Amendment concerns may, in some cases, never occur. Some cases may be
proven by “neutral methods of proof”279 and fail to implicate a church’s selection and control of its
ministers and the church-minister relationship. Categorically excepting all hostile work environment
claims by ministerial employees, before a speculative First Amendment issue even arises, would be
premature. If it becomes clear that a plaintiff cannot prevail without inquiring into ecclesiastical policy
or other matters protected by the First Amendment, a court can and must, at that point, end the suit.280
That case-by-case analysis may at times require nuanced, challenging decisions does not mean courts
should acquiesce and abandon their constitutional duty.281Courts must attempt to use neutral principles
of law to adjudicate the case before them;282 if First Amendment issues arise, courts can react
accordingly.283
Not only is a categorical approach unnecessary under the First Amendment, it may actually
pose independent Establishment Clause problems.284 The Establishment Clause prohibits religious
exemptions from generally applicable laws when the exemption would do material harm to third
challenges a statute on First Amendment grounds, it ‘will not be set aside when any state of facts may reasonably be conceived
to justify it.’ This heavy burden on the challenger places ‘[a]ll presumptions . . . in favor of the constitutionality of a statute and
this continues until the contrary is shown beyond a reasonable doubt.’”) (citations omitted).
278 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 274 (citing McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840, 853–54 (N.J. 2002)).
279 Minker v. Balt. Ann. Conf. of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
280 See, e.g., id. at 1360; Costello Publ’g Co. v. Rotelle, 670 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that if some form of
inquiry is permissible without violating the constitution, the claim need not be dismissed); McKelvey v. Pierce, 800 A.2d 840,
852-53 (N.J. 2002) (“It could turn out that in attempting to prove his case, appellant will be forced to inquire into matters of
ecclesiastical policy . . . Of course, in that situation, a court may grant summary judgment on the ground that appellant has not
proved his case and pursuing the matter further would create an excessive entanglement with religion. On the other hand, it may
turn out that the potentially mischievous aspects of Minker’s claim are not contested by the Church or are subject to entirely
neutral methods of proof. The speculative nature of our discussion here demonstrates why it is premature to foreclose appellant’s
contract claim.”).
281 Cath. Bishop of Chicago v. N.L.R.B., 440 U.S. 490, 518 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[W]hile the resolution of
the constitutional question is not without difficulty, it is irresponsible to avoid it by a cavalier exercise in statutory interpretation
which succeeds only in defying congressional intent.”); McKelvey, 800 A.2d at 844 (“The First Amendment does not immunize
every legal claim against a religious institution and its members. The analysis in each case is fact-sensitive and claim specific,
requiring an assessment of every issue raised in terms of doctrinal and administrative intrusion and entanglement. In our view,
the lower courts failed to engage in that kind of painstaking analysis and painted with too broad a brush when dismissing
McKelvey’s case in its entirety. We thus reverse and remand the case to the trial court to determine, on an issue-by-issue basis,
whether any of McKelvey’s claims may be adjudicated consistent with First Amendment principles.”).
282 See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979).
283 Courts must require religious employers satisfy the burden of persuasion. See Vartanian, supra note 194, at 1056–57.
First Amendment concerns must be explicitly stated and the specific harassment itself – both the substance and the manner of
criticism – justified and embraced by the religious employer. See id. at 1068; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 17, at 293.
284 See Prince of Peace Lutheran Church v. Linklater, 28 A.3d 1171, 1184 (Md. 2011) (“Declining to impose neutral and
otherwise applicable tort or contract obligations on religious institutions and ministers may actually support the establishment of
religion, because to do so effectively creates an exception for, and may thereby help promote, religion.”).
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parties.285 An exemption that favors religion at the expense of the non-religious – an exemption that
burdens those not benefitted – is impermissible.286 As one commentator put it: to “say that religious
liberty must encompass the right to harm others is to turn the First Amendment on its head.”287
Depriving hundreds of thousands288 of employees the right to workplaces with dignity and free from
harassment on the basis of sex, race, national origin, age, and disability unquestionably imposes material
harm on those individuals.
A case-by-case analysis recognizes this danger and responds accordingly. The First
Amendment may at times bar hostile work environment claims by ministerial employees when inquiry
into the claim will excessively entangle a court with religious questions.289 At the same time, a case-by-
case analysis ensures that the courthouse door is not automatically shut. A categorical exemption, to
the contrary, would allow those hundreds of thousands of employees to be harmed without any
accountability, even when no First Amendment issues are at play. A categorical exemption would
certainly “turn the First Amendment on its head.” 290
The contrary argument holds that a categorical rule is necessary to protect religious
organizations’ First Amendment rights. “If a Church must litigate a case to final judgment before the
judiciary will respect its First Amendment immunity, it will, in effect, lose it.”291 The concern is that
judicial inquiry itself undermines a church’s religious liberty,292 and that case-by-case analysis is
285 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 722 (1994) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“[A] religious accommodation demands careful scrutiny to ensure that it does not so burden nonadherents or
discriminate against other religions as to become an establishment.”); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 711– 12
(1985).
286 See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (holding that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act comported with the Establishment Clause only because courts that apply it “must take adequate account of the burdens a
requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries”).
287 Freeman, supra note 201, at 147 (quoting Jessica R. Vartanian, Note, Confessions of the Church: Discriminatory Practices
by Religious Employers and Justifications for a More Narrow Ministerial Exception, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 1049, 1049–50 (2009)).
288 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S.Ct. 2049, 2081–82 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Brief
for Prof. Leslie C. Griffin et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch.
v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (No. 10-533) (“The Hartford Institute concludes that there are ‘roughly 335,000’ religious
congregations in the United States . . . According to Bureau of the Census estimates, in 2008 government agencies reported that
179,682 religious organizations of all sorts had about 1.7 million paid employees.”). Religious organizations and advocates are
also taking steps to increase the number and expand the category of employees covered by the ministerial exception, indicating
that this number will only grow. See, e.g., FIRST LIBERTY, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY PROTECTION KIT FOR CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS 34,
36 (2016), https://firstliberty.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/RLA_CHRISTIAN_SCHOOLS.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LWV8-364V].
289 Religious employers must bear the burden of persuasion to demonstrate such excessive entanglement. Vartanian,
supra note 194, at 1068.
290 Freeman, supra note 201, at 147 (quoting Jessica R. Vartanian, Note, Confessions of the Church: Discriminatory Practices
by Religious Employers and Justifications for a More Narrow Ministerial Exception, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 1049, 1049–50 (2009)).
291 Brief for the State of Indiana, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petition for Reh’g En Banc, at 6, Demkovich v. St.
Andrew’s the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 973 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-2142).
292 N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979) (“It is not only the conclusions that may be reached
by the Board which may impinge on rights guaranteed by the Religion Clauses, but also the very process of inquiry leading to
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insufficiently protective.293 As courts have noted, however, the ministerial exception and church
autonomy broadly “may serve as a barrier to the success of a plaintiff’s claims, but [neither] affect[s]
the court’s authority to consider them.”294 Moreover, courts engaging in case-by-case analysis must
nonetheless dismiss claims once it is clear that they cannot be proven without infringing on the First
Amendment.295 Religious defendants can bring motions for summary judgment or motions to dismiss
as soon as there is evidence that further inquiry would infringe upon their constitutional rights. The
flexibility of case-by-case analysis protects religious organizations’ religious liberty and meets
constitutional demands. Case-by-case analysis further respects the protective bend of Supreme Court
precedent while protecting individuals from irremediable harassment.
CONCLUSION
Workplace harassment is ubiquitous, abhorrent, and to some extent, remediable. Access to
justice depends on access to hostile work environment claims. Hostile work environment claims by
ministerial employees can coexist with robust religious freedom and respect for religious organizations’
First Amendment interests and rights. Case-by-case analysis of ministerial employees’ hostile work
environment claims is a constitutionally sound path forward, and respects individual rights and religious
organizations’ freedom. Ministerial employees’ hostile work environment claims need not, and should
not, be categorically barred by the ministerial exception.
293 See Laycock, supra note 3, at 1392 (arguing that the possibility of government intrusion is “too unpredictable to be
avoided on a case-by-case basis. [It] can be minimized only by a strong rule of church autonomy”).
294 Skrzypczak v. Roman Cath. Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1242 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Petruska v. Gannon
Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303 (3d Cir. 2006)); see also Kirby v. Lexington Theological Seminary, 426 S.W.3d 597, 608 (Ky. 2014).
295 See, e.g. Preece v. Covenant Presbyterian Church, No. 8:13CV188, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52751, at *7 (D. Neb.
Apr. 22, 2015).
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